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Abstract
Security bugs in software systems are often reported after incidents of mali-
cious attacks. Developers often need to resolve these bugs quickly in order
to maintain the security of such systems. Bug resolution includes two kinds
of activities: triaging confirms that the bugs are indeed security problems,
after which fixing involves making changes to the code.
It is reported in the literature that, statistically, security bugs are reopened
more often compared to others, which poses two new research questions: (a)
Are developers “rushing” to triage security bugs too soon under the pressure
of deadlines? (b) Do developers need to spend more time fixing security bugs
to avoid frequent reopening?
This thesis explores these questions in order to determine whether security
bug fixing should take a higher priority than other bugs to avoid malicious
attackers exploiting vulnerabilities before the problems are fixed, and whether
security bug fixing should take a higher priority than other bugs.
In this thesis a quantitative approach has been adopted by conducting sta-
tistical empirical studies to observe the behaviour of software developers
engaged in dealing with security bugs.
Firstly, the concept of “rush” has been borrowed from the time management
literature to refer to the behaviour of people delivering work under the pres-
sure of deadlines. By observing how developers deliver bug resolution before
the deadline of releases,the degree of rush has been measured as the ratio
between the actual time spent by developers during triaging and the theo-
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retical time the developers have by delaying the fixes until the next regular
release.
In this thesis, a suggest that delaying bug assignment helps find the right
developer and gives the developer more time to prepare for the same workload
with more relaxed planning constraints. Secondly, to analyse the complexity
of security bug fixes, the fan-in complexity of functions relevant to security
bugs has been measured, rather than simply measuring the time spent by
the software developers on the fixing of such bugs.
The first null hypothesis is tested using a Man-Whitney method on five soft-
ware case studies, Samba, Mozilla Firefox , Red Hat , FreeBSD and Mozilla.
The second null hypothesis is tested by comparing the results of fixing secu-
rity and non-security bugs from the Samba and Mozilla Firefox case studies.
Statistically significant results suggest that security bugs are triaged in a
rush compared to non-security bugs for Red Hat , FreeBSD and Mozilla. In
terms of fan-in, the results of the Samba and Mozilla Firefox case studies
suggest that security bugs are more complex to fix compared to non-security
bugs.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In the year 2013, on average 13 vulnerabilities were reported every day out
of the annual total of 4,794 records in the National Vulnerability Database
(NVD) 1. Statistics show that the number of reported vulnerabilities in year
2013 was higher than the last five years (Florian, 2014). Most of these re-
ported vulnerabilities have been exploited by malicious attackers (Nagaraju
et al., 2013), which caused the loss of millions of dollars and damaged the
reputation of vendors. Not only is the exploitation of reported vulnerabilities
growing, but recent trends show an increase in the exploitation of unknown
or zero-day vulnerabilities as well (Donohue, 2014). The exploitation of such
types of vulnerability is even worse for the reputation of the vendors because
the zero-day vulnerability attacks not only cause security failure in the soft-
ware system but also show the vendors’ lack of awareness about the security
flaws in their system.
For example, credit and debit cards worth $130 million dollars were compro-
mised in a security breach of Heartland Payment Systems Inc. The company
has spent a total of $139.4 million dollars dealing with this security breach
issue (Vijayan, 2010). The cause of such a massive data breach was a bug
in the code of a web form which allowed access to the company’s corporate
1http://nvd.nist.gov/
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network (Cheney, 2010).
In another security breach, a flaw was found in the release 1.7 of the Java
Virtual Machine (JVM) software owned by the Oracle Inc. This security
flaw started a debate in the news media about the security standards’ of
Oracle (Finkle, 2013). During the investigation of the attack, security ex-
perts from the US Department of Homeland Security explained that hackers
had exploited a bug in a version of Java using Internet Explorer to install
malicious software.
In general, a bug is defined as a problem in the software specification, design
and code or unexpected behaviour of the software program which leads to the
failure or improper functionality of the software system (Grubb and Takang,
2003). Specifically, a bug is referred to as security related when it creates
vulnerability in the software, which the malicious attackers could exploit to
attack the system (Viega and McGraw, 2011).
For example, the malicious attackers can exploit a buffer overflow bug in
which a program tries to store more data in a buffer (temporary data storage
area or random access memory) than its intended range (Margaret, 2007). As
the result of buffer overflow, the extra data of a program corrupts or overwrite
data into the adjacent buffers. This extra data may contain code designed
to do specific actions or send instructions to attack the software system.
Resulting in damage to data or disclosing the confidential information. The
buffer overflow bug is one of the common causes of security vulnerabilities
relevant to random access memory. Usually, such vulnerabilities lead to the
data integrity breaches.
It was reported by the institute of Security Leadership Essentials for Man-
agers (SANS) that in 2008 just two bugs caused half a million security
breaches 2. The growing exploitation of system vulnerabilities due to bugs
indicates the failure of software system security at two levels. The first source
of failure is overlooking at the security requirements of the system up-front,
2http://www.sans.org/
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with no or bad security planning of the system by designers and the igno-
rance of programmers on security aspects of the system while writing the
code. The second source of the problem is giving insufficient attention to
maintaining the security of the system by resolving security bugs.
As a matter of fact all the security relevant bugs (those which can cause
potential vulnerability in the system) are difficult to detect at the testing
stage (Pfleeger and Pfleeger, 2006). Therefore, software developers not only
need to hunt for the security bugs (Arce, 2002) but also need to ensure the
proper resolution of such bugs to protect the system from malicious attackers.
For this reason, the focus of this thesis is to study about the resolution of
security bugs.
The gaps relevant to security bugs has been identified in Chapter 2 literature
review. In the following subsections, the key contribution of this thesis, the
research methodology and the structure of the thesis are discussed.
1.1 Contributions
This thesis provides a novel contribution concerning the resolution of security
bugs. Before explaining each contribution of the thesis, below is the definition
of terms used.
In this thesis, triaging refers to a process to priorities and assign bugs to
developers for fixing during their resolution. Throughout this thesis, “rush“
is refered to the time management behaviour of software developers on the
triaging of bugs. The “fan-in“ is an already established concept refers to the
number of times a function is invoked by the other functions. The Common
Vulnerability and Exposure (CVE) bugs are used as the confirmed security
bugs in this thesis.
The following are the contributions of this thesis.
• A technique to measure the degree of “rush” (the time management
behaviour of software developers) on the triaging of security and the
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other types of bug.
According to the knowledge of the author of this thesis, this thesis is the
first to introduce the notion of “rush” in the triaging of bugs. The concept
of “rush” is borrowed from the time management literature for referring to
the behaviour of software developers delivering work under the pressure of
deadlines. Originally, “rush” is a concept in the time management litera-
ture refers to the behaviour of people delivering work under the pressure
of deadlines. During the triaging of bugs, it is challenging for the develop-
ers to priorities the fixing of bugs given the resource constraints and release
deadlines. Especially in the case of security bugs, it is very important to
priorities the fixing of high priority bugs and still deliver the fix on sched-
ule. The proposed technique to measure “rush“ in the triaging of bugs is
developed keeping this concern in mind. Therefore, the author of this thesis
claims that the proposed technique to measure “rush” in the triaging of bugs
is unique and new.
• A technique to measure the complexity of functions relevant to security
and the other types of bug fixes using the “fan-in” metric.
The fan-in is an already established concept, however according to the knowl-
edge of the author of this thesis. This thesis is the first to apply the fan-in
concept for developing a technique to measure the complexity of functions
relevant to bug fixes.
• An empirical study to measure “rush” (the time management behaviour
of software developers) on the triaging of security bugs and to measure
the complexity of functions relevant to bug fixes.
In this thesis, the demonstration of applying the techniques to measure rush
and the complexity of functions relevant to bug fixes to five case studies
(Samba, Mozilla Firefox ,Red Hat , FreeBSD and Mozilla) is unique. Es-
pecially, this thesis is the first to use Samba case study for analysing the
activities of bug resolution.
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1.2 Research Methodology
In this thesis, the research is organised in the following stages as shown in
Figure 1.1: (a) search bug fixing literature, (b) identify gaps in the literature
studies, (c) classify the gaps into groups, (d) Formulate the research ques-
tions to fill the gaps, and (e) validate that the research questions has been
addressed and (f) validate that the gaps has been filled by addressing the
research questions.
1.2.1 Search security bug’s resolution literature
In the literature search phase, the terms such as “security bug resolution”,
“resolving security bugs”, “fixing security bugs” and “security bugs”, etc.
has been provided to the literature databases. Mainly, the “Google Scholar”
and “Computer Science Bibliography (DBLP)” has been used to search for
the relevant studies. To include/exclude a study in the list of studies rele-
vant to the resolution of security bugs, the author of this thesis has manu-
ally scanned the “title”, “abstract”, “introduction” and “conclusion” of each
study. Although, the author has also skimmed through the studies in some
cases when it was not straight forward to decide whether the study is relevant
to the resolution of security bugs.
1.2.2 Identify gaps relevant to the resolution of secu-
rity bugs
To find gaps in the studies relevant to the resolution of security bugs, first
each study has been read by the author of this thesis to identify the “problem”
addressed in the study, the proposed “solution” to the problem and the
method of “evaluation”. In the next stage, the “problem”, “solution” and
the “evaluation” method of each study has been synthesised and scrutinised
by the author of this thesis. In some cases, the study has been discussed with
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Figure 1.1: The graphical representation of research methodology with the
stages and inputs/outputs.
the supervisors to take their opinion. Finally, a gap is determined in each
study by the author of this thesis based on his synthesis and observations
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about the study.
1.2.3 Categorise gaps
After finding gaps in the studies relevant to the resolution of security bugs,
each gap has been categorised according to the triaging and fixing activities
of bug resolution. The bug triaging involves reproducing and prioritising the
bugs by the software developers before assigning it to fixing. The bug fixing
involves making changes to the code. The outcome of bug triaging process is
bug reports and the outcome of bug fixing process is code patches. Therefore,
after categorisation of gaps relevant to the resolution of security bugs; further
literature search has been conducted to find out studies relevant to triaging
of security bugs by the software developers, fixing security bugs by making
changes to the code and about the outcome of bug resolution as the bug
reports and code patches.
1.2.4 Identify gaps relevant to triaging and fixing ac-
tivities
The similar process to identify gaps relevant to the resolution of security bugs
as discussed in Sub-section 1.2.2 has been adopted to identify gaps relevant
to the bug triaging and fixing activities. In this way, the list of gaps has
been prepared that contains gaps relevant to the triaging of security bugs by
the software developers, the fixing of security bugs by making changes to the
code and about the outcome of bug resolution as the bug reports and code
patches.
1.2.5 Group gaps
As the gaps relevant to the resolution of security bugs are categorised into
two main categorise (bug triaging and fixing). Therefore, each gap is related
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to bug triaging and fixing from the list of gaps. The gaps relevant to the
triaging of security bugs has been grouped together and named as the “first
group of gaps” and the gaps relevant to the fixing of security bugs are named
as the “second group of gaps”.
1.2.6 Formulate the research questions
During the gaps analysis of security bug resolution, it is found in the literature
that security bugs are triaged faster and reopened more frequently compared
to the other bugs. Therefore, two research questions relevant to the triaging
of bugs has been identified as listed in Section 2.6. Similarly, a gap relevant
to the fixing of security bugs has been identified during the gaps analysis
of security bug resolution. The bug fix complexity is relevant to the fixing
activity of bug resolution; therefore the gaps relevant to the fixing of bugs
are grouped into one category. The two research questions are formulated to
know about the bug fix complexity of security bugs as reported in Section 2.6.
1.2.7 Address the research questions
To address the formulated first research question, a technique to measure
rush in the triaging of bugs has been developed. Similarly, to address the
second research question, a technique to measure bug fix code complexity
has been developed.
1.2.8 Validate that the research questions has been ad-
dressed
For the validation that research question has been addressed, the following
two options has been scrutinsed for conducting the case studies.
Deeply involved with development process:. The first option is to
observe the security bug resolution process in a real industrial setting by
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actually resolving the bugs or interviewing the software developers. For this
purpose, An industrial case study needs to be searched that already has a
bug resolution process in place and whose developers have some experience
of resolving security bugs. However, the following challenges are identified
in conducting the study in such a way.
1. As a researcher, getting access to an industrial security critical project
is difficult if not impossible, because usually organisations cannot share
their security breach data with outsiders;
2. Software developers are generally reluctant to share detailed inside
knowledge about their personal process for resolving security bugs be-
cause of the fear to lose privacy;
3. Researchers may impose confirmation bias and subjectivity by getting
deeply involved with the developers which may cause the change of the
data;
4. All organisations have different processes in place for bug resolution,
therefore repeating one study requires changing the settings to another
case study which may lose the generality of the findings.
On the other hand, the strength of conducting this type of case study is that
developers can immediately confirm and verify the findings.
Collecting and analysing historical data from publicly available
projects:. Another option is to analyse how the security relevant bugs
were resolved in the past using historical bug resolution data. Although the
threat of not getting the documentation of security bugs from the organi-
sations is still valid for such types of case studies, a key advantage is that,
bug reports and code repositories of open source security critical projects
is readily accessible from their repositories and could be verified by other
developers and researchers.
The following enumerates the advantages of conducting a case study using
historical data.
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1. It is easier to repeat the study using the historical data of bugs resolved
in the past rather than using qualitative data that are subject to varying
interpretations;
2. The findings are easier to generalise as the other researchers can verify
them by repeating the study using the same settings.
3. The results produced are more reliable compared to the results inter-
preted from the process of bug resolution or through the interviews of
the software developers.
4. Getting access to the historical data is relatively easier than arranging
interviews with the software developers.
One drawback of conducting a case study using historical data is that the
results might be different if the organisation changes their process in the
future.
Taking into account of the advantages and disadvantages of the two options,
the decision has been made to conduct the case studies using the historical
data of open source projects (e.g., Samba 3) to observe their security bug
resolution process. The five case studies (Samba, Mozilla Firefox , Mozilla,
Red Hat , FreeBSD) has been conducted to validate that first research ques-
tion has been addressed. On the other hand, the technique to measure code
complexity of bug fixes has been validated on the two above cases (Samba,
Mozilla Firefox ).
1.2.9 Validate that the gaps has been filled
At-last, the results of case studies has been mapped with the research ques-
tion to conclude that the identified gaps in the literature have been addressed.
3https://www.samba.org/
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1.3 Justifying the choice of empirical case study
During the design of research, the author of this thesis has thought about the
reliability of results and what to consider as a valid answer from the outcome
of the research. The purpose of this thesis is “to investigate the resolution
process of security bugs”, which require observations of bug resolution pro-
cess. Therefore, the positivists philosophical stance has been adopted for
accepting the evidence in response to the designed research questions. The
positivists philosophical stance states that “all knowledge must be based on
logical inference from a set of observable facts” (Easterbrook et al., 2008).
In the above subsection about “validate that the research questions has been
addressed” 1.2.8 of research methodology section, the options to chose a re-
search method for collecting data are discussed. The confirmatory case study
method has been chosen as a method of investigation because the purpose of
this study is to test the hypothesis based on existing literature (Yin, 2014).
Another reason of choosing the empirical case study is the availability of data
in the open source projects as discussed in above section 1.2.8. This study is
designed for the multiple cases for the greater validity. As the nature of this
study is confirmatory, therefore same results are expected from the outcome
of different case studies (literal replications). A security critical project is a
unit of analysis for each case in this thesis. The process of resolving bugs
might be different for different organisations and projects. It means chang-
ing context can influence on the observations. Therefore, the case studies are
preferred over the controlled experiments for this study.
1.4 Structure of the thesis
The thesis is organised into five chapters. In Chapter 2, gaps relevant to
security bugs has been identified and organised into groups. After the group-
ing of gaps, two research questions has been formulated to be addressed in
the technical chapters. The Chapter 3 is about measuring rush the time
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management behaviour of software developers on the triaging of bugs. The
technique is applied to the five case studies that includes Samba, Mozilla
Firefox , and Red Hat , FreeBSD and Mozilla. The Chapter 4 is about mea-
suring the fan-in complexity of functions relevant to bug fixes. The fan-in
complexity technique is applied to Samba and Mozilla Firefox case studies.
The both chapters include the details of algorithms used for the development
of technique. The chapters also include explanation of tools developed for
data collection and analysis to conduct the case studies. Finally, Chapter 5
provides the conclusion and discusses the future work and vision.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
Security bugs are one of the primary concerns for software developers during
maintenance of the systems as motivated in the introduction. The focus of
this chapter is on categorising existing studies relevant to security bugs to
address the problem of maintaining security in a software system.
2.1 Security Bugs
According to Zaman et al. (2011) on average a security bug reopens 2.5 times
more frequently than a performance bug and significantly more often than
the other types of bug. One can conclude from this finding that the security
bugs are more often prematurely resolved compared to the other bugs by
the software developers. Following this finding, the study has also reported
that on average a security bug is triaged faster compared to the other bugs
during their resolution. The study has explained that it might be possible
that developers strategically triage security bugs faster to hide information
about the fixing of such bugs from the attackers to avoid further exploit of the
system. However the faster triage and then frequent reopening also pose a
question whether the software developers rush to resolve security bugs on the
triaging. The follow up question is whether rush by the software developers is
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the reason of security bugs premature assignment and frequent reopening. As
the focus of this thesis is on the resolution of security bugs, which involves
bug triaging. Therefore, investigating whether developers rush to triaging
security bugs will help to improve the overall process of resolving security
bugs.
In another study, Bhattacharya et al. (2013) have measured the median bug
fixing time of security and the other types of bug for the Mozilla and Google
code-based apps. The study has found that the security bugs were given high
priority in the Mozilla case study compared to the Google code-based apps.
The finding indicates that security bugs are treated differently in different
systems. Therefore, it is very difficult to generalise that faster triage of
security bugs is because of their higher priority compared to the other bugs.
On the other hand, Mitropoulos et al. (2012) has found that the number
of unresolved security bugs are increasing in the projects compared to the
other bugs. Similarly, Li et al. (2006) have reported that the percentage of
unresolved security bugs is increasing in the Mozilla Firefox and Apache open
source systems.The both studies has not provided any scientific explanation
of this phenomena. Although, Li et al. (2006) has explained that the proper
resolution of security bugs is becoming important for all types of software
systems. This finding leads to a question that why more security bugs are
found unresolved in such systems. one can argue that complexity in fixing
of such bugs might attribute to their status being unresolved for the longer
period of time compared to the other bugs. In another study, Caglayan et al.
(2012) have argued that a bug fix takes more time of developers in case its
affected code have higher complexity. However, it is difficult to justify this
argument higher code complexity contributes to the status of security bugs
being unresolved without knowing whether such bugs are more complex to
fix.
As the bug fix complexity is related to the fixing stage of bug resolution,
therefore knowing about the complexity of security fixes will also help to
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improve the resolution process of security bugs.
In this section, focus has been on the studies about and relevant to security
bugs, and the following gaps labelled by SB, which stands for Security Bugs
has been identified.
SB1: There is a need to investigate whether rush by the software developers
on the triaging of security bugs is one of the reasons of their premature
assignment and then frequent reopening (Zaman et al., 2011),(Bhat-
tacharya et al., 2013).
SB2: There is a need to investigate whether security bugs are more complex
to fix compared to the other bugs (Caglayan et al., 2012).
The gap relevant to rush in triaging and bug fix complexity relevant to fixing
activities of security bugs are related to the resolution process, which will be
detailed in the next section.
2.2 Bug Resolution Process
Triaging and fixing are the main activities involved in bug resolution (Xia
et al., 2013). Bug triaging is concerned with the prioritisation and assign-
ment of bugs to the right developers for fixing (Mani et al., 2013). After the
assignment of a bug to the right developer, the bug fixing involves chang-
ing the code affected by the bug (Zeller, 2002). The following sections are
discussing studies relevant to triaging and fixing activities.
2.2.1 Bug triaging
The developer who triage a bug needs to make sure that enough information
is available to reproduce the bug (Anvik et al., 2006). According to Baysal
et al. (2012), the fixing and reopening of a bug depends on how well the bug
is triaged. In two other studies, Guo et al. (2010) and Guo et al. (2011)
have argued that there is a higher chance of bug re-assignment if a developer
assign bug for fixing without understanding its cause.
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Similarly, Jeong et al. (2009) have argued that there is a less chance of re-
assigning bugs to other developers in case the developer who triages the
bug (a) carefully reproduce the bug by understanding the cause of bug, and
(b) has assigned the bug to the right developer according to the problem
description. All the above studies have emphasised that the developer should
carefully triages the bug. However, none of these studies have quantitatively
analysed bug triaging activity by the software developers.
As bug triaging activity is relevant to the resolution of security bugs, therefore
without analysing bug triaging activity one can not know whether security
bugs are triaged in rush. Therefore, quantitative analysis of bug triaigng
activity is necessary to fill a gap relevant to the security bugs.
In another study, Francalanci and Merlo (2008) have found that the most
of bugs are fixed closer to the release dates. They have explained that this
phenomenon shows when the release date approaches developers hasten to fix
bugs with the aim of including changes in the forthcoming release. Usually,
the delivery of a bug fix is prioritised during triaging. Therefore in this hustle
to fix bugs in the forth coming release, practically the developers can prolong
the fixing of low priority bugs those can still be delivered in the next release
in parallel to fixing the high priority bugs. In this way, the developers can
deliver more high priority bugs within their resource limits. However, in
their analysis to fix bugs near to the release deadlines. The study has not
considered this practical fact that the developers can prolong the fixing of
some bugs to fix more high priority bugs.
As the focus of this study is to measure rush during the triaging of bugs
reflecting the real life software project. Therefore, it is necessary to consider
the practical situation of bug fixing when the developers have to fix high
priority bugs within the given release deadlines.
Similarly, Hooimeijer and Weimer (2007) have found that the daily workload
of the developers can affect on their ability to triage bugs. This finding
indicates that there is a possibility that the developer who triages the bug
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with the bigger workload might assign it to the other developer without
understanding the cause of the problem. Therefore, there is a possibility that
the developers might rush during the triaging of bugs due to the workload
and can assign the bug to the wrong developer leading to the re-assignment
or re-opening of bugs. However, the study has not measure rush during the
triaging of bugs by the software developers.
2.2.2 Bug fixing
During the fixing of bugs, the developers make changes to the affected source
code as a solution to recover the system in its operational state (Thung
et al., 2013). According to Zhang et al. (2013) have found that the quickness
and slowness in the fixing of bugs by developers depends on the complexity
of code relevant to bugs. Similarly, Murphy-Hill et al. (2013) have found
that the developers fix the bugs with the higher code complexity nearer to
the release deadlines compared to the bugs with the lower code complexity.
These finding indicate that the bugs with the higher code complexity can be
difficult to fix. However, neither study have measured the complexity of code
relevant to bug fixes to argue that the bugs with the higher code complexity
are indeed difficult to fix.
In their study, Zhang et al. (2012), have argued that the bugs with the higher
code complexity are not as simple to fix. Similarly, Shihab et al. (2010) have
argued that the bugs with the higher code complexity are complex to fix
for the software developers. In other studies, Marks et al. (2011), Kim and
Whitehead, Jr. (2006) and Weiss et al. (2007) are agreed with the findings
of Shihab et al. (2010) that code complexity of bug fixes can increase their
fixing time. But these studies have used the bug fixing duration and average
bug fixing time as the measure of the complexity of code relevant to bugs.
However, it is not necessary that the developers immediately start making
changes to the code without spending some time in understanding the cause
of the bug. Therefore, the claim that those bugs took more time to be fixed by
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developers are complex without actually measuring their code complexity is
not fully quantified. The above studies are relevant to this thesis as they are
supporting the argument presented in this thesis to measure the complexity
of bug fixes.
Other studies by Anbalagan and Vouk (2009) and Giger et al. (2010) have
acknowledged that claiming the bugs those are more complex to fix take the
more time of developers is very shallow without measuring the complexity
of code relevant to bugs using the code complexity metric. However, these
studies themselves have not measured the complexity of code relevant to bugs
using any other technique than the fixing time.
2.2.3 Gaps in the study of bug resolution
In this section, the focus was on the studies about and relevant to the bug
resolution process which include bug triaging and fixing. The following is a
summary of gaps identified from the studies, the gaps are labelled as BR,
which stands for Bug Resolution.
BR1: There is a need to quantitatively analyse how the developers triage
bugs during their resolution (Guo et al., 2010),(Guo et al., 2011),(Jeong
et al., 2009).
BR2: There is a need to measure rush during bug triaging considering the
practical handling of bugs by the software developer near to the re-
lease deadlines (Francalanci and Merlo, 2008),(Hooimeijer and Weimer,
2007).
BR3: There is a need to measure the complexity of code relevant to bug
fixes to argue that bugs with the higher code complexity are difficult
to fix (Zhang et al., 2013),(Murphy-Hill et al., 2013).
BR4: There is a need to verify that the bugs with the higher code complex-
ity are more difficult to fix using different complexity metrics from the
fixing time (Zhang et al., 2012),(Shihab et al., 2010),(Kim and White-
head, Jr., 2006),(Weiss et al., 2007),(Anbalagan and Vouk, 2009),(Giger
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et al., 2010).
In previous two sections, the two key gaps has been identified: (a) there is a
need to measure rush by the software developers in the triaging of bugs, and
(b) the bugs with the higher code complexity are difficult to fix. Therefore, in
the next two sections the focus of study is on the rush behaviour of software
developers during triaging of bugs and on studies about the complexity of
code relevant to bug fixes.
2.3 Software Developers
In software maintenance, the developers’ personal traits, such as the be-
haviour towards time management, play an important role in their outputs
(Wynekoop and Walz, 2000). Therefore, a detailed discussion is provided to
describe the relationship between the time management behaviour of soft-
ware developers and how such behaviour can be measured.
According to Ye and Kishida (2003), Ko et al. (2006) and Xiao and Afzal
(2010) that not only the technical skills but the personality traits, such as the
time management behaviour of the developers are equally important to suc-
cessfully resolve the bugs. Usually, the developers are not working on a single
project or doing only one task at a time. Therefore, it becomes extremely
important how the software developers manage their time to complete the
assigned tasks within the deadlines (Sillitti et al., 2003). Bad time manage-
ment behaviour means that either the developer delays the completion of
the task or quickly finishes the task in a rush without caring much about
doing the work properly. Rush is a time management behaviour of software
developers under the pressure of deadlines as suggested by the Ko¨nig and
Kleinmann (2005).
Other studies by Rasch and Tosi (1992) and Ho¨st et al. (2000) have discussed
how time pressure can affect the rate of task completion by developers, be-
cause under time pressures either the developers try to finish the task in
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a rush or slow down the work on some tasks. All these studies have indi-
cated that time pressure affects developers’ outputs. However, none of these
studies has discussed how rush the time management behaviour of software
developers, can be measured when they are under the pressure of time.
Peralta et al. (2010) have measured the daily and weekly utilisation of time
by software developers to analyse how they managed their time to complete
the assigned tasks. However, the study did not measure rush the time man-
agement behaviour of software developers on the triaging of bugs.
In other studies, Zhong et al. (2000), Prechelt and Unger (2001) and Yanyan
and Renzuo (2008) are of the view that the time spent by software devel-
opers to complete a certain task is an indication of their time management
behaviour. For example, Johnson et al. (2003) have measured the time spent
daily by the software developers in completing the assigned tasks to evalu-
ate their behaviour towards achieving the set deadlines. They have argued
that such behavioural evaluation helps to determine the developers’ personal
process of completing the tasks. However, the study did not discuss whether
rush the time management behaviour of software developers on the triaging
of bugs, can be measured by calculating the time spent by them on their
daily task of bug assignment.
In another study, Shihab et al. (2012) have argued that reopening of bugs
depends on how fast or slow a bug is resolved by the software developers.
Based on this finding, one can conclude that the bugs which are resolved
quickly are more likely to reopen. Similarly, Jongyindee et al. (2012) have
found that the bugs marked as NEW or CLOSED by expert software devel-
opers are less likely to re-assign or reopen compared to the bugs which are
marked by the incautious developers. But neither study discusses whether
rush the time management behaviour of software developers can be one of
the reasons of their premature assignment and subsequently reopening.
In this section, the focus of study was on the studies about and relevant to
the time management behaviour of the software developers. The following
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gaps are identified from the studies. The gaps are represented by the symbol
Software Developer (SD).
SD1: There is a need to measure rush the time management behaviour of
software developers on the triaging of bugs (Rasch and Tosi, 1992) ,
(Ho¨st et al., 2000), and (Peralta et al., 2010).
SD2: There is a need to verify whether rush the time management behaviour
of software developers on the triaging of bugs can be measured by
calculating the time spent by them on bug assignment (Prechelt and
Unger, 2001) and (Johnson et al., 2003).
SD3: There is a need to verify whether rush the time management behaviour
of software developers can be one of the reasons of premature bug
assignment and subsequently their reopening (Jongyindee et al., 2012),
(Shihab et al., 2012).
In brief, a discussion is provided to study the code complexity metrics to
measure the complexity of code relevant to bug fixes. Techniques for such
measurement will be compared in the next section.
2.4 Code Complexity
The amount of time spent by the developers during the fixing of bugs is
directly related to the complexity of code (Banker et al., 1989). The code
metric is a quantitative method to measure the complexity of code relevant to
software systems (Henry and Selig, 1990). The source lines of code (SLOC),
Cyclomatic Complexity (CYC), and fan-in are examples of source code met-
rics based on the call graph of the system (Abandah and Alsmadi, 2013).
The call graph reflects the complexity of the code based on the relationship
between the functions (Ryder, 1979). The source line of code (SLOC) is a
code metric to count the size of a program or software system (Albrecht
and Gaffney, 1983). The Cyclomatic Complexity (CYC) helps to measure
the linearly independent paths in a program or software system (McCabe,
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1976). However, neither technique helps to count the function calls. But
the fan-in metric is useful to count the number of times a function has been
called by the other functions (Marin et al., 2007).
In the following sub-sections, an explanation about the use of call graph
based metrics to measure the complexity of code relevant to bug fixes.
2.4.1 Call graph based metrics
The complexity of code relevant to bugs could increase the fixing time sig-
nificantly. As discussed above, there are different code metrics to measure
the complexity of the code statically. This sub-section focuses on measuring
the complexity of code relevant to bug fixes.
According to Zhang et al. (2007), the modules relevant to bugs with more
lines of code are time consuming to fix. However, the study does not mea-
sure the complexity of code relevant to bug fixes. Rather, it uses the average
module fixing time as the complexity metric. Multiple reasons, such as the
functions of the module, are tightly coupled and changing one function re-
quires changes in the other functions, which can cause a longer fixing time for
bugs. But the study does not measure the complexity of functions relevant
to bug fixes.
In another study, Nistor et al. (2013) has measured the complexity of bug
fixes inside a patch using the lines of code metric (SLOC). Based on their
results, they argued that the bugs with the larger sized patches are com-
plex to fix. The larger size of the patch does not necessarily mean that the
functions inside the patch are complex. It is possible that the logic used by
the programmer to solve a problem needs more lines of code, which actually
increases the size of the patch. Therefore, it is very difficult to generalise
that all the bug fixes with the larger patch size are complex without actually
measuring the complexity of functions relevant to bug fixes inside the patch.
Similarly, Kula et al. (2010) has measured the complexity of code relevant
to bug fixes using the cyclomatic complexity (CYC). They have found that
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the affected code of bug patches with a complex structure of control flow
have higher fixing durations. It is possible that the developers have to search
through the whole patch to make code changes because of the broken control
flow, which causes the longer fixing duration. But this does not mean that
the functions inside the patch are also complex to fix. Therefore, it is very
difficult to generalise that the affected code relevant to bugs takes a longer
fixing duration without measuring the complexity of functions relevant to
the affected code of the bugs. However, the study does not measure the
complexity of functions inside the patch.
Shin and Williams (2008) have even gone one step further for computing the
code complexity of security and non-security functions by measuring their
lines of code and control flow structure. But the complexity of functions
relevant to bug fixes has not been computed. Secondly, in this study the
metrics of lines of code and cyclomatic complexity are used for measuring
the complexity of functions. In this way of measuring the complexity of
functions, the many functions which are invoked by the other functions inside
a patch have been ignored. When a function code is invoked by the other
functions inside a patch then the developers need to make changes to the
multiple functions relevant to bug fix, which increases the fixing duration.
Therefore, there is a need to use different complexity metrics to measure the
complexity of functions relevant to bug fixes.
2.4.2 Fan-in metric
Fan-in is one of the complexity metrics that is likely to tell the difference
between security and functionalities. It computes how many times a function
has been called by the other functions. In this section, the studies relevant
to fan-in analysis are discussed.
Marin et al. (2004) have argued that code relevant to security implementation
crosscuts many functions and have more fan-ins. However, the study has not
measured the fan-ins of functions relevant to security bug fixes.
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In an earlier study, using a concrete example program (Saleem et al., 2013),
the author of this thesis has argued that all the crosscutting functions that
implement a security requirement shall be updated when the change to the
system is relevant to protection and asset (Haley et al., 2008). However, that
study has not quantified the complexity of crosscutting security functions in
terms of fan-ins.
In another earlier study, Yu et al. (2004) have discovered that crosscutting
implementation of a system often coincides with the crosscutting refinement
of quality requirements, which include security. The number of clones used
in the case study of the work has not been re-factored into high fan-ins
functions. Therefore, it was not possible to consider the fan-in impact of
crosscutting functions on fixing security bugs.
According to Mubarak et al. (2010), a bug fix with high fan-in classes is
more complex to fix but usually the developers have to change the affected
functions of the class relevant to a bug and that changed function might be
called by the other classes as well. Therefore, one cannot say whether a bug
is simple or complex to fix without measuring the fan-in of changed functions
relevant to a bug, rather than measuring the fan-in of classes relevant to a
bug.
Zhang et al. (2008) have used the fan-in metric to identify the methods whose
functionality is needed across the system. They argue that such methods
generate high fan-in values. This finding indicates that the developers have
to spend more time on changing the high fan-in functions. However, the
study have not measured the fan-in of functions relevant to bug fixes.
2.4.3 Gaps in the study of code complexity
In this section,the focus has been on the studies about and relevant to code
complexity metrics to measure the complexity of code relevant to bug fixes.
The following gaps are identified from the studies. The gaps are represented
by the label CC, which stands for Code Complexity.
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CC1: There is a need to measure the complexity of functions relevant to
a bug fix using different complexity metric from the SLOC and CYC
(Zhang et al., 2007),(Nistor et al., 2013),(Kula et al., 2010),(Shin and
Williams, 2008).
CC2: There is a need to verify whether functions relevant to bug fixes have
high fan-in values (Mubarak et al., 2010),(Marin et al., 2004),(Zhang
et al., 2008).
In the sections of studies relevant to software developers and code complexity,
two key gaps has be found: (a) the need to measure rush the time manage-
ment behaviour of software developers on bug triaging, by calculating the
time spent by the software developers on bug assignment, and (b) the need
to measure the fan-in complexity of functions relevant to bug fixes. The
historical data of bug triaging is available in the bug reports, therefore to
realise the first gap, the literature relevant to bug reports for measuring rush
the time management behaviour of software developers is listed in the next
section. Similarly, the fixed code relevant to bugs is available in the code
patches, therefore the studies relevant to code patches to realise the second
gap are also included in the next section.
2.5 Software Artefacts
The bug reports and code patches are related types of software artefacts
produced during software maintenance. Usually, both artefacts are treated
as rich historical data to analyse the bug attributes and the quality of the
fixing code. In the following sub-sections, existing studies relevant to bug
reports and code patches are discussed.
2.5.1 Bug reports
In software development, whenever a new bug is found, it is documented
using a “bug tracking system” such as Bugzilla (do Rego et al., 2008). The
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Bugzilla system requires from the reporter of the bug to fill relevant fields for
the documentation of the bug (Serrano and Ciordia, 2005), so the developers
can understand, reproduce and fix the problem. Filling information in these
fields is necessary to have a good quality bug report (Bettenburg et al., 2008).
The bug report not only helps to understand and reproduce the problem but
is also useful to keep track of the current state of bug.
In the Bugzilla system at the time of documenting the bugs, usually the
following fields are recorded (The Bugzilla Team, 2012). First, a bug is
assigned a unique identifier and its status field is updated according to its
stage in the life-cycle. A bug life-cycle starts from the time when the bug is
reported and it ends when the bug is finally closed. The names of components
and versions are recorded in which the bug is found. The importance of the
bug based on its priority and severity are also logged in the bug reports. The
name of the person to whom the bug is assigned for triaging or fixing, the
bug ids on which the bug depends on for fixing and the bug ids which are
dependent on fixing of this bug, the time when the bug is reported and the
time when the bug was last modified are all recorded in the bug report.
In research, the bug reports are used as rich historical information for the
analysis of past bugs. For example, Jain et al. (2012) have extracted the bug
reports marked as FIXED and VERIFIED from the historical bug reports
data. This past bug report data has been used for relatively quick assign-
ment of the newly reported bugs to the right developers based on their past
experience of fixing similar types of bug. The draw-back of assigning bugs
to developers based on the past bug reports assignment of bugs to the devel-
opers can reduce the triaging time, but usually the quick assignment of bugs
during triaging can lead to the re-assignment and reopening of bugs. How-
ever, the study has not extracted the bug reports data in a way to validate
whether the developers quickly assigned the bugs during the triaging.
Similarly, Ahmed and Gokhale (2009) have extracted the time stamps when
the bug status is reported and resolved from the bug modification histories
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to measure the time spent on the resolution of bugs. In another study,
Ahmed and Gokhale (2008) have used the states of bugs to measure the bug
resolution duration according to their severity levels. Usually, the time spent
on the resolution of bugs is measured by taking the difference of time when
the bug is RESOLVED as fixed till the time period it was REPORTED.
However, the data extraction fields used in these studies are not usable for
the analysis of bug triaging.
Lamkanfi and Demeyer (2012) have extracted the time stamps when the bug
status is changed to reported and resolved, but usually the overall duration
spent on the resolution of bugs depends on the amount of time spent in
the triaging and fixing of bugs. In particular, the triage duration depends
on the availability of developers and their understanding of the problem.
However, the study has not extracted the bug status time stamps when the
bug is reported till it is assigned to the developers for measuring the time
management behaviour of software developers, such as rush during triaging.
Wu et al. (2011) have extracted the bug time stamps when the bug status is
resolved without taking into account the time stamps when the bug status
is reopened. Another study by Wang et al. (2012) has extracted the bug
reports based on time stamps when the bug status is resolved or the bugs are
marked as closed. In this way, both studies have extracted the bugs which
are either marked as closed or their status is updated to resolved, but in some
cases the bugs marked as resolved might reopen later. Therefore, ignoring
the time stamps when the bug status is reopened while extracting the bug
resolution time-stamps data might mislead on the duration of some bugs.
2.5.2 Code patches
The software system development is managed using the version control sys-
tems such as git (Loeliger and McCullough, 2012). Each version control
system maintains a log entry in the “commit log” whenever a developer
commits a patch in the source code (Chen et al., 2004). A patch reflects the
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modifications made by the developers and the description of code changes.
Usually, a patch has a section of log message and another section describing
the code changes.
The log message contains a unique commit number to distinguish it from
the other patches, author name and email, the date of commit and a list
of names and emails of the other people to inform about the commit. The
description of code changes part begins with a file name and the bunch of
code lines started with the affected line numbers, old and new versions of the
file followed by the code fragments.
Zhou et al. (2012) have extracted the patched code relevant to bug fixes from
the code patches to analyse the size of patched code to fix the bugs. Such
an analysis is useful for determining the characteristics of the whole code
segment rather than the individual functions. However, the study did not
extract the functions relevant to fixed bugs to measure their complexity.
In another study, Fischer et al. (2003) and Cubranic and Murphy (2003) have
used the BUG and FIXED keywords to find the bugs in the patches relevant
to bug fixes. Usually, the fix in the code is marked with the bug number at
the time of commit by the developers. Therefore, one can parse the static
code of patches to extract the fixed code relevant to bugs. However, it is not
necessary that the developers always use the same keywords such as BUG
and FIXED to commit the code relevant to the bugs at the time of patching
the fix.
The changes to buggy code for fixing a bug may affect the multiple code frag-
ments of a patch or of the multiple patches (Sliwerski et al., 2005). Therefore,
such modified parts of the code can be extracted by taking the difference of
two patches using the git diff command (MacKenzie et al., 2003). How-
ever, the patch difference has not been used in these studies to extract the
functions relevant to bug fixes.
Kim and Ernst (2007) and Tian et al. (2012) have extracted the changed sets
from the patches relevant to bug fixes. Extracting the complete changed set
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helps to know which lines or code fragments have been changed during the
bug fix, but one cannot analyse those functions relevant to the bugs which
have been changed during the fix without extracting the names of functions
from the changed set.
On the other hand, Kim et al. (2006) have parsed the patches relevant to bug
fixes to extract the components from the code hunks. Extracting the names
of components relevant to the bug fixes helps to analyse those components
which need more attention for the fixing of bugs. However, the developers
will still face problems in the fixing of bugs because there are many functions
in each component, so they have to go through all the functions relevant to
the bugs for fixing them properly. On the other hand, in cases where the
developers know which functions relevant to a bug fix have been called more
often such knowledge can reduce their effort in searching through the whole
system to fix the functions relevant to a bug. Therefore, measuring the code
complexity of functions relevant to a bug fix rather than a component will
help developers, but measuring the code complexity of functions relevant to
a bug fix is not possible without extracting the changed functions from the
code hunks of patches.
2.5.3 Gaps in the study of software artefacts
In this section, first the studies about and relevant to extracting the bug
status time stamps to measure the ”rush” time management behaviour of
software developers has been discussed. Then, the studies relevant to and
about extracting the changes functions from the changed set of the code
patches are focused upon. The following gaps are identified from the studies.
The gaps are labelled by SA, which stands for Software Artefacts.
SA1: There is a need to extract the bug status time stamps when the bug
is reported till it is assigned to developers for measuring rush the time
management behaviour of developers on bug triaging (Jain et al., 2012),
(Ahmed and Gokhale, 2009),(Lamkanfi and Demeyer, 2012).
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SA2: There is a need to extract the bug time stamps considering the re-
opening time of bugs (Wu et al., 2011),(Wang et al., 2012).
SA3: There is a need to extract the changed functions from the patches
relevant to a bug fix to measure the complexity of functions relevant
to bug fixes fix (Kim and Ernst, 2007),(Tian et al., 2012),(Kim et al.,
2006).
2.6 Summary of Literature Gaps
The motivation of this study is to investigate the bug resolution as discussed
in the Chapter1. Based on the motivation of the study, two key gaps has
been identified involving triaging and fixing activities for the resolution of
security bugs. Therefore, all the gaps identified from the literature survey
are organised into two groups. The first group of gaps is related to the
triaging activities of bug resolution. On the other hand, the second group of
gaps is related to the fixing activities of bug resolution.
The following are gaps organised in the first group. The gaps related to the
first group are labelled by GG1, which stands for the first Gap Group.
GG1.1: There is a need to investigate whether rush by the software devel-
opers on the triaging of security bugs is one of the reasons of their
premature assignment and then frequent reopening [SB1, §2.1].
GG1.2: There is a need to quantitatively analyse how the developers triage
bugs during their resolution [BR1, §2.2.3].
GG1.3: There is a need to measure rush during bug triaging considering the
practical handling of bugs by the software developer near to the release
deadlines [BR2, §2.2.3].
GG1.4: There is a need to measure rush the time management behaviour of
software developers on the triaging of bugs [SD1, §2.3].
GG1.5: There is a need to verify whether rush the time management be-
haviour of software developers on the triaging of bugs can be measured
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by calculating the time spent by them on bug assignment [SD2, §2.3].
GG1.6: There is a need to verify whether rush the time management be-
haviour of software developers can be one of the reasons of premature
bug assignment and subsequently their reopening [SD3, §2.3].
GG1.7: There is a need to extract the bug status time stamps when the bug
is reported till it is assigned to developers for measuring rush the time
management behaviour of developers on bug triaging [SA1, §2.5.3].
GG1.8: There is a need to extract the bug time stamps considering the
reopening time of bugs [SA2, §2.5.3].
The first group of gaps is organised based on the resolution of security bugs
involving triaging activities. Therefore, the following research question about
the triaging of security bugs is derived from the first group of gaps. In fact,
this research question will fill the first gap relevant to the security bugs as
listed in Section [SB1 2.1].
RQ1: How can ‘rush’ of software developers be measured from their time
management behaviour exhibit in the bug repository? If rush can be
measured, is the hypothesis of ‘security rush’ be confirmed statistically?
Is rush a reason for prematurely assigning security bugs to software de-
velopers and subsequently reopening the bugs more frequently?
The following are gaps organised into the second gap group, which is labelled
by GG2:
GG2.1: There is a need to investigate whether security bugs are more com-
plex to fix compared to the other bugs [SB2, §2.1].
GG2.2: There is a need to measure the complexity of code relevant to bug
fixes to argue that bugs with the higher code complexity are difficult
to fix [BR3, §2.2.3].
GG2.3: There is a need to verify that the bugs with the higher code com-
plexity are more difficult to fix using different complexity metrics from
the fixing time [BR4, §2.2.3].
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GG2.4: There is a need to measure the complexity of functions relevant to a
bug fix using different complexity metrics from the source lines of code
(SLOC) and cyclomatic complexity (CYC) [CC1,§2.4.3].
GG2.5: There is a need to verify whether functions relevant to bug fixes
have high fan-in values [CC2, §2.4.3].
GG2.6: There is a need to extract the changed functions from the patches
relevant to a bug fix to measure the complexity of functions relevant
to bug fixes [SA3, §2.5.3].
The second group of gaps is organised based on the resolution of security
bugs involving fixing activities. Therefore, the following research question
about the fixing activities of security bugs is derived from the second group
of gaps. In fact, this research question will fill the second gap relevant to the
security bugs as listed in Section [SB2 2.1].
RQ2: How can the complexity of a bug fix be measured from the code
repositories? Is the complexity of a security bug fix higher on average
than the complexity of a non-security bug?
All the identified literature gaps are summarised in Figure 2.1.
The first research question RQ1 will be addressed in Chapter 3 and the second
research question RQ2 will be addressed in Chapter 4.
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RQ1 RQ2 
SB1 SB2 
SB3 
BR2 SD2 BR3 
BR4 BR1 SD1 SD3 
CC1 
CC2 
SA1 
SA2 
SA3 
Gap group1 Gap group2 
(Chapter 3) (Chapter 4) 
Figure 2.1: The summary of literature gaps grouping and the derived research
question from each gap group.
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Chapter 3
Measuring Rush
To maintain the security of software systems, often there is a perception that
security bugs need to be resolved quickly in response to malicious attacks.
Therefore, usually software engineers treat them as urgent problems. How-
ever, it is evident from a literature study by Zaman et al. (2011) reported
in Section 2 of Chapter 2 that security bugs reopen more often than other
bugs. The reopening of security bugs could be attributed to rush.
To know that the developers really triage security bugs in a rush, there is
a need to understand the behaviour of developers when triaging a security
bug, their psychology and their time management skills. However, it is not
practical in a real life project to monitor the developers’ behaviour while they
are triaging the bugs, because the developers might not act normally when
they are aware that somebody is assessing their rushing behaviour.
On the other hand, the artefacts produced by developers can give clues about
the nature of task done by them in a specific time period. But one cannot
say that the task done by the developers in a specific time reflects the fact
that security bugs are triaged in a rush.
On the other hand, to address the “yes and no” part of RQ1, the following
null hypothesis is derived.
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RQ1: How can ‘rush’ of software developers be measured from their time
management behaviour exhibit in the bug repository? If rush can be
measured, is the hypothesis of ‘security rush’ be confirmed statistically?
Is rush a reason for prematurely assigning security bugs to software de-
velopers and subsequently reopening the bugs more frequently?
In order to address the “how” part of RQ1, a technique to measure ’rush’ is
developed and explained in this chapter.
Hypothesis 1 Median rush on the triaging of security bugs is not higher
compared to the non-security bugs.
In this thesis, the notion of ‘rush’ is introduced in the triaging (process to
priorities and assign bugs to the developers for fixing) of bugs. The rush is
defined as the ratio between the actual time spent by the developers during
triaging and the theoretical time the developers have by delaying the fixes
until the next regular release. In this way, the developers have more flexibility
to relax the constraints for fixing high priority bugs earlier and still deliver
the bug fixes on the release time within the resource constraints.
By intuition, rush is a relative measure that relates the time used for planning
and the time used for the work. The metric of rush is based on the concept
of planning towards the deadlines (Svahnberg et al., 2010) to complete the
assigned tasks.
The theoretical measurement of rush considers the effect of delaying the
work. Suppose the maintenance project originally plans to deliver a fix of a
certain bug at the time of a certain release. If there is a rush, the bug may be
delivered before that time. The delivery of fix with the smallest rush requires
delaying the assignment of the bug till the moment when the work has to be
started. In other words, the triaging duration can be prolonged. Therefore,
the lower the ratio, the higher the rush in relation to the next release.
The following example is used to demonstrate the rush measurement in the
48
triaging of a bug. The bug 7494 of the Samba case study has been reported
on 04/06/2010 at the time 17 : 55 by an internal developer “Jeremy Allison”.
The time-stamp of bug report has been logged in the Samba Bugzilla sys-
tem. After the report of bug, the developer “Lars Mu¨ller” has reproduces the
bug and prioritised and assigned it to the developer “Jeremy Allison”. The
time-stamp 04/06/2010 18 : 11 when the bug is assigned for fixing has also
been logged in the Samba Bugzilla system. In this case, the bug is reported
and assigned for fixing to the same developer. However, it is not necessary
that a bug is assigned to the developer for fixing who has reported it. After
the assignment of bug, the developer “Jeremy Allison” has fixed the bug and
set the status of bug being resolved as fixed. The time-stamp 16/06/2010
06 : 21 when the bug status is changed from assigned to resolved has been
logged in the Samba Bugzilla live system. All the time-stamps when the
bug is reported, assigned and resolved are shown in the Figure 3.1.
Now in retrospective, let’s say in the weekly release fix there are three re-
leases schedule to be delivered on 07/06/2010, 14/06/2010 and 21/06/2010
respectively. In fact, the bug is already resolved after the delivery of first and
second release as shown in the Figure 3.1. Therefore, it can only be included
in the third release, which means in reality postponing the delivery of fix for
this bug till the release deadline. Effectively, it is the same as postponing
the assignment of this bug to fix till the maximum delay time. So, it can be
included in the third release. In this way of using the maximum delay time
for the assignment of bug, the more high priority bugs can be fixed within
the same resources. Software developers are one of the examples of resources
available for the fixing of bugs. The theoretical delay time is denoted by the
symbol tplanned, which the developers have to postpone the assignment of bug
for fixing till the next regular release.
Remember, the rush is defined as the ratio of actual and theoretical triage
duration. Therefore, first we need to calculate the actual triage duration,
maximum delay time for postponing the assignment of bugs and theoretical
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triage duration to measure rush in the triaging of example bug 7494.
The actual triage duration is the difference of tassigned and treported, which is
denoted by the symbol d1 in the Figure 3.1. The actual fixing duration is the
difference of tresolved and tassigned, which is denoted by the symbol d2. For the
example bug 7494, the actual triage duration is 0.0115625− days and actual
fixing duration is 11.51 − days. By taking the difference of release deadline
which is 21/06/2010 in this case and actual fixing duration d2 in this case
11.51− days. The result is the maximum delay time 6.73505787− days. It
means the assignment of bug 7494 for fixing can be delayed till this time for
delivering it in the third weekly release.
After the calculation of delay time, the theoretical triage duration for the
bug 7494 is calculated by taking the difference of tplanned and treported. The
calculated theoretical triage duration is 6.72349537 − days denoted by the
symbol d′1. At-last the rush in the triaging of example bug 7494 is measured
by taking the ratio of d1 and d
′
1, which is .00171− day.
The rush has been computed by measuring the duration from the bug reports.
Therefore, the set of logs used to recover the bug reports from the Bugzilla
issue tracking system is defined in Definition 1.
Definition 1 The set of logs chosen in this study are: LOGS = {logB, logA}.
The set of logs contains the bug entry log logB and the bug activity log logA.
The set of bug entry logs logB is defined as logB = {bi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n ∧ n ∈ N ,
where bi ∈ B and B is the set of bugs.}
The bug activity log logA is defined as logA = {(bi, (li, ti)) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n∧n ∈ N ,
where bi ∈ B, li is the set of bug life cycle labels li ⊂ L, and ti is a time-stamp
of li, and ti ∈ T . }
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Figure 3.1: An example to explain the concept of rush using the time-stamps
of the bug number 7494 of Samba case study.
51
3.1 Example Logs
The bug entry log logB contains a pair of elements with each pair as a single
bug report. In each pair, the element b represents the bug id.An example bug
entry log’s screen-shot is shown in Figure 3.2. In the figure, the retrieved bug
id and bug report time stamp are highlighted with arrows. In this definition
the set of security bugs Bs is the subset of bugs B.
The bug activity log logA contains pairs of elements with each pair as a single
bug status label and time-stamp. In each pair, b represents the bug id, C
represents the set of bug life cycle labels, and t represents the bug status
time. An example screen-shot of the bug activity log is shown in Figure 3.3.
We have used the script to obtain the bug entry log logB, and bug activity
log logA from Bugzilla bug tracking system. The scripts to obtain both logs
logB and logA are available in Appendix A.1 and A.2 respectively.
These logs are used to recover the bug time stamps data. In the next sec-
tion,an explanation has been provided about the choice of measuring rush
from the bug reports.
3.2 Computing Rush from the Bug Reports
In this section, the actual bug triage and fixing durations are defined and
the procedure to compute each duration is described using the algorithms.
The triage and fixing durations are based on the status labels of bugs. A
bug status label indicates the current stage of bug fixing. Zeller (2005) have
described the Bugzilla bug life cycle based on the Mozilla Firefox case
study. Zaman et al. (2011) have extended the Bugzilla bug life-cycle by
adding a “reopened” arrow when the bug status is ASSIGNED as shown in
the Figure 3.4.
In this study, the same Bugzilla bug life cycle as reported by Zaman et al.
(2011) has been followed. However, it has been found that the figure is in-
complete without two more kinds of arrows, which has been observed during
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Figure 3.2: An example bug entry screen-shot.
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Figure 3.3: An example bug activity screen-shot.
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the analysis of Samba case study, These are absent from the extended figure
of Zaman et al. (2011). The first arrow is added to indicate that a bug can be
tossed from the ASSIGNED state to the NEW state during fixing. The sec-
ond arrow is added to indicate that a bug can reach the state of RESOLVED
directly from the NEW state, skipping an intermediate ASSIGNED state. In
this latter case, the bug does not need to pass through the ASSIGNED state
for resolution. In the legend of the figure, the dotted line and circles are used
to represent our added lines from the original figure of Zaman et al. (2011).
The bug status labels in the bug life cycle are used to identify the current
health of the bug. From Figure 3.4, one can derive the set of Status labels L,
which can include L={ REPORTED, UNCONFIRMED, NEW, ASSIGNED,
RESOLVED, VERIFIED, CLOSED, REOPENED }.
A bug is assigned the status of REPORTED when an internal or external user
of the system reports a bug at the start of the bug fixing process. The bug
is assigned the status label of UNCONFIRMED to check that the reported
bug is valid or invalid. If the developers agree that the reported bug is a
valid bug then the status of NEW is assigned to the bug. Otherwise, the bug
is given the status of RESOLVED to ensure that the bug has been validated
by the testing team.
The status label of a bug is changed from NEW to ASSIGNED once the bug
is assigned to some developers for fixing. From ASSIGNED status, if the
bug is fixed then it is marked as RESOLVED for the testing team to verify
the fix. Otherwise, the bug is given the status label of REOPENED either
if there is some information missing or the developer does not have enough
knowledge to fix it. Once the bug is given the status of RESOLVED, then it
is the responsibility of the testing team to verify the fix and assign the status
label of VERIFIED if the bug was properly fixed. Otherwise, if the testing
team does not agree with the bug resolution, the bug is assigned the status
label of REOPENED. All these status changes represents the life cycle of a
bug in the Bugzilla system as shown in the Figure 3.4.
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To retrieve the status labels relevant to triage and fixing durations, three
states of a bug’s life cycle are important, namely REPORTED, ASSIGNED,
RESOLVED. Although obvious in Figure 3.4, these states are not always
found in the bug database. For example, when RESOLVED is not found, the
status of CLOSED as its placeholder has been used in this thesis. However,
the bugs whose “ASSIGNED” state is absent due to one of RESOLVED state
via the edges INVALID, DUPLICATE, WONTFIX, or WORKSFORME has
not been considered in this thesis. In this thesis,the bugs those come from
the transition “FIXED” edge are chosen for the analysis because only then
is the fixing time not regarded as zero.
It has been observed during the study that there can be multiple states in a
bug’s life-cycle. For example, because of reopening, there can be more than
one “RESOLVED” state on the original life-cycle diagram in the life-cycle of
a bug. For the sake of simplicity, only the latest RESOLVED state to regard
all the reopening activities as a somewhat prolonged fixing process has been
considered in this thesis. There may be more than one ASSIGNED state due
to the reopening as well. In these cases, the very last ASSIGNED state in
the trace has been chosen for the bug analysis in this thesis. Formally, the
set of bug life cycle status labels C used to retrieve the bug status labels is
defined in Definition 2.
Definition 2 The set of derived bug life cycle : C. The set of bug status is
defined as C = {REPORTED,ASSIGNED,RESOLV ED}.
Algorithm 1 is used to get the derived bug life cycle. The set of bug life cycle
labels L given in the bug activity log logA is input. The set of derived bug
life cycle C is output. The procedure starts by initialising the set of derived
bug life cycle to the empty set. A multi branch switch statement is used to
retrieve the different cases of the set of bug life cycle labels L. In case the
element l of the set of bug life cycle labels L is UNCONFIRMED, an element
c with the value REPORTED is added in the set of derived bug life cycle C.
Similarly, a new element RESOLVED is added in the set of derived bug life
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cycle C in case the element l of the set of bug life cycle labels L is equal to
RESOLVED. In any other case, the bug is assigned the status label of NEW.
Data: The set of bug status labels l ∈ L
Result: C = {REPORTED,ASSIGNED,RESOLV ED}
1 C = {};
2 switch (l ∈ L) do
3 case REPORTED
4 c = REPORTED;
5 break;
6 end
7 case ASSIGNED
8 c = ASSIGNED;
9 break;
10 end
11 case RESOLV ED
12 c = RESOLV ED;
13 break;
14 end
15 endsw
Algorithm 1: ObtainAssignedResolvedStatus : Obtain the set of bugs
derived life cycle labels C.
After these pre-processing steps, now each bug is only associated with at
most three states. The rather complex state transition diagram on the upper
part of Figure 3.4 is now simplified to convert it into the much simplified
state model on the lower part of the diagram. With these status labels, it is
now sufficient to compute the values of bug event stamps.
In the Bugzilla issue tracking system, the time at each stage of bug status
change is recorded in the bug activity log. Therefore, the set of derived status
labels are used to derive the bug event stamps whenever the bug status is
changed. The event stamps of each bug according to the current status of
bug resolving keep track of the time whenever a bug status is changed from
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Figure 3.4: Relationship between bug life cycle labels L of Zaman et al.
(2011) and the derived bug life cycle labels C.
one to another.
For example, the bug no. 7067 has been reported by the Samba developer
“Jeremy Allison” at 2010 − 01 − 2618 : 48 : 57UTC in the Samba system.
The bug has been reported in the product “Samba3.5”. For reporting a bug,
it is necessary that the bug reporter have a valid account at the Bugzilla
live system for Samba. After login the system with a valid user account,
the user must use the option “File a Bug” available at the home page of
Bugzilla system 1. The process of reporting a bug starts with selecting a
product of the system in which the reporter found the bug. After selecting
the right product to report the bug, the reporter needs to fill the bug report
form by filling the fields that includes “Component”, “Version”, “Summary”,
“Severity”, “Hardware”, “OS” and “description”. The Bugzilla live system
logs the time of reporting a bug at the time of completing the bug report form
by the developer, which is logged as the bug reporting time in the system.
Once the bug is reported in the system, the Samba developer verifies the
1https://bugzilla.samba.org/
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bug whether it is a valid by reproducing it based on the description given
in the bug report. In the case of aforementioned bug 7067, the same person
“Jeremy Allison” has reported and reproduced the bug. The bug reporting
guidelines for the Samba system has been provided on the following link
“https://bugzilla.samba.org/page.cgi?id=bug-writing.html”.
By using the similar method of bug reporting the bug 7104 has been marked
as reopen by the developer “Jeremy Allison”. A bug is marked as reopen
if the developer found that an already fixed bug is the source of problem
in the program. The reopened bug is not marked as “REPORTED” and
“NEW” because it is not a new problem. Therefore, it is directly assigned
to a developer or to a group of developers for fixing. An arrow from the
“RESOLVED” stage to “REOPENED” and from “REOPENED” stage to
‘ASSIGNED” stage is indicating the phenomenon of bug reopening in the
Bugzilla bug life cycle figure 3.4. It is observed that the example reopened
bug 7104 has been directly assigned to developer “Jeremy Allison” for fixing
rather than marking it as “REPORTED” and “NEW”.
After recovering the bug resolution event stamps, it is possible to measure the
actual triage durations. The set of bug event stamps is defined in Definition 3.
Definition 3 The set of bug event stamps : E. The set of bug event stamps
E is defined as: E = {(bi, (ci, ti)) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n ∧ n ∈ N}.
Algorithm 2 is used to retrieve the bug event stamps. The set of bug activity
log logA, and the set of derived bug status is input. The set of bugs event
stamps E according to the derived status is output. The algorithm starts by
initialising the set of event stamps E to the empty set, then for each element
of the set of bug event stamps E. The value of each bug status label li is
obtained using the algorithm 1.The obtained value is assigned to the element
ci of the set of derived bug life cycle labels C. The value of bug id bi, derived
life cycle label ci, and the time stamp for one particular event ti is assigned
to the set of event stamps.
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Data: The set of bug activity log logA = {(bi, (li, ti))}, and the set of
derived bug life cycle C
Result: E = {(bi, (ci, ti))}
1 E = {};
2 foreach (bi, (li, ti)) ∈ logA do
3 ci = ObtainBugsDerievedStatus(li);
4 E = E ∪ {(bi, (ci, ti))}
5 end
Algorithm 2: ObtainBugEventStamps: Obtain the set of bug fixing event
stamps E.
The event stamps of each bug according to the current status of bug reso-
lution keep track of the time whenever a bug status is changed from one to
another. Therefore, after recovering the bug resolution event stamps, it is
possible to measure the actual triage and fixing durations. The set of bug
triage and fixing durations τ1 and τ2 are defined in Definition 4
Definition 4 The set of bugs’ traige durations : τ1, and the set of bugs’
fixing durations: τ2. The set of bugs’ triage durations τ1 = {(bi, d1i) | 1 ≤
i ≤ n∧n ∈ N}., where bi ∈ B and d1i ∈ τ1. The set of bugs’ fixing durations
τ2 = {(bi, d2i) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n ∧ n ∈ N}, where bi ∈ B and d2i ∈ τ2.
Algorithm 3 is used to get the set of bug triage τ1 and fixing τ2 durations.
The input is the set of bug event stamps E. The output is the set of bug
triage τ1 and fixing τ2 durations sets. The procedure starts by initialising the
set of bug triage τ1 and fixing τ2 durations to the empty set, then for each
bug b in the set of bug event stamps E. The value of derived bug life cycle
label c is checked using switch statement. In case the value of variable c is
REPORTED then the value of life cycle time ti is assigned to the variable
tREPORTED. In case the value of variable c is ASSIGNED then the value of
time ti is assigned to the variable tASSIGNED. Similarly, in case the value of c
is RESOLVED then the value of time ti is assigned to the variable tRESOLV ED.
Then the bug triage duration d1 is measured by subtracting the time when
the bug is assigned to developers for fixing tASSIGNED to the time when the
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bug is reported tREPORTED. Likewise, the duration of bug fixing time d2 is
measured by subtracting the time when the bug is resolved tRESOLV ED from
the time when the bug is assigned to the developers for fixing tAssigned. The
computed bug triage d1 and fixing d2 durations are assigned to the bug triage
and fixing durations sets τ1 and τ2 respectively.
Data: The set of bug event stamps according to the bug status labels
E
Result: τ1 = {(b, d1)}, τ2 = {(b, d2)}
1 τ1 = {};
2 τ2 = {};
3 foreach (b ∈ logB) do
4 foreach
(c ∈ {REPORTED,ASSIGNED,RESOLV ED}(b, (c, t)) ∈ E)
do
5 if (b, (c, t)) ∈ E then
6 tc = t;
7 end
8 end
9 if (tASSIGNED ∧ tREPORTED) then
10 d1 = tASSIGNED − tREPORTED;
11 τ1 = τ1 ∪ {(b, d1)};
12 end
13 if (tRESOLV ED ∧ tASSIGNED) then
14 d2 = tRESOLV ED − tASSIGNED;
15 τ2 = τ2 ∪ {(b, d2)};
16 end
17 end
Algorithm 3: ObtainBugDuration: Obtain the bug triage and fixing du-
rations τ1 and τ2.
Through the above pre-processing steps, the values of bug triage d1 and fixing
d2 durations has been calculated. Now, it is possible to measure the value of
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planned rush in the triaging of bugs.
3.3 Model for Measuring the Weekly Release
Fix Triage Durations
In this section, the model to measure the weekly release fix triage duration
has been explained for considering the situation when the developers have
time to plan the work. Figure 3.5 describes the model of measuring bug
triage duration based on the weekly release fix. In this model, it is assumed
that a bug can be planned in a release as long as it is reported before the
delivery of a release. In this way, our model measures the time from when
the bug is reported until it is released, which is the exact time spent before
the release of a bug. It includes the bug fixing time and any waiting time
before the release of the bug. For measuring the triage duration according
to the weekly release fixes, the status labels C ′ has been used in the thesis,
which is defined as the C ′ = {REPORTED,PLANNED,RESOLV ED}.
Figure 3.5 shows the relationship between the simplified life cycle of bugs
to the planned bug status labels C ′. The left hand part of Figure 3.5 is
relevant to the set of derived bug life cycle status labels C. The right hand
part of Figure 3.5 is relevant to the set of planned bug life cycle status labels
C ′. This relationship is used to compute the triage and fixing durations
at the time of planning (represented by the d′1 d′2 respectively), although
the planned triage duration d′1 to compute the value of weekly release fix
durations has been used. Before proceeding to compute the value of weekly
release fix triage duration, it is required to have the knowledge about the
release date of each bug. Formally, the set of release dates of bugs is defined
in Definition 5.
Definition 5 The set of weekly releases dates : Rτ . The set of weekly release
dates Rτ is defined as : Rτ = {(bi, trelease) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n ∧ n ∈ N}.
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Figure 3.5: The relationship between bug derived life cycle C to the planned
bug life-cycle C ′.
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Figure 3.6: The bug status and resolution description.
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Algorithm 4 is used to get the set of weekly release dates. The input is the
set of bug event stamps E. The output is the set of weekly release dates
Rτ . The procedure starts by initialising the set of bug event stamps E to
the empty set. Then for each value of the set of bug event stamps E, the
condition is checked that the resolved time of bug tRESOLV ED should not be
null to ensure that each bug has already been resolved. If the bug has already
been resolved then the fix of bug is delayed to the latest release date rather
than the same day by allowing the delay of three days. The delay of three
days has been added because it is assumed that “Wednesday” as the release
day of every week starting from “Monday”. The retrieved release date of bug
has been assigned to the release date variable trelease. Finally, the bug id b
and the release date trelease are added to the set of releases dates Rτ .
Data: The set of bug event stamps E
Result: Rτ = {(bi, trelease) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n ∧ n ∈ N
1 Rτ = {};
2 foreach (b, (RESOLV ED, tRESOLV ED)) ∈ E do
3 if tRESOLV ED 6=< NULL > then
4 trelease = {tresolved + ||7− (tresolved − 3), 7|, 7|};
5 Rτ = Rτ ∪ {(b, trelease)};
6 end
7 end
Algorithm 4: ObtainWeeklyReleaseDates: Obtain the set of weekly re-
lease dates Rτ .
After determining the release dates for each bug, now it is possible to measure
the triage duration of a bug in case the developer have more time to triage
the bug during the planning phase of the work (b, d′1). The set of precise
triage duration based on weekly release fix is defined in Definition 6.
Definition 6 The set of precise triage duration based on the weekly release
fix : τ ′1. The set of precise triage duration based on the weekly release fix is
defined as: τ ′1 = {(bi, d1′i) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n ∧ n ∈ N}.
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Algorithm 5 computes the bugs triage duration based on the bugs fixed in
weekly releases. The input is the set of bugs and their weekly release fix dates
Rτ , the set of bug event stamps E, and the set of bug fixing durations τ2.
The output is the set of weekly release fix triage durations τ1
′. The procedure
starts by initialising the set of weekly release fix triage durations τ1
′ to the
empty set. Then for each bug of (b, trelease) in the set of bugs fixed in the
weekly releases Rτ , the (bi, (REPORTED, treported)) in the set of E bug event
stamps, and the (b, d2) in the set of τ2 bug fixing duration. The resolved date
tresolved and the fixing duration d2 of bug has been deducted from the release
date trelease to get the triage duration d1
′ spent by the developers when they
have time to delay the triaging. The weekly release fix triage duration d′1 is
then added to the set of precise triage durations τ1
′.
Data: The set of weekly released dates : Rτ , and the set of bug event
stamps E
Result: τ1
′ = {(bi, d1′)}
1 τ1
′ = {};
2 foreach (b, trelease) ∈ Rτ ,(bi, (REPORTED, treported)) ∈ E,(b, d2) ∈ τ2
do
3 d1
′ = trelease − tresolved − d2;
4 τ1
′ = τ1′ ∪ {(bi, d1′)};
5 end
Algorithm 5: ComputeWeeklyReleaseFixTriageDuration: Compute the
set of weekly release fix triage durations τ1
′.
After pre-processing of bugs fixed in the weekly releases, one can compute
the rush in the triaging of bugs.
3.4 Measuring Rush in the Triaging of Bugs
In this section, the value of rush for the triaging of bugs has been computed.
The planned rush in the triaging of bugs is a median ratio of the bug’s actual
triage duration d1 and the delayed release triage durations d
′
1. To verify
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our hypothesis 1, the rush in triaging of all the bugs (resp. security and
non-security) bugs as B = Bs (resp. B = Bs¯) has been measured, which is
defined in Definition 7.
Definition 7 The planned rush in the triaging of the bugs is : λ(B). The
rush in triaging of bugs is defined as: λ(B) = M˜ (b,d1)∈τ1
(b,d′1)∈τ ′1
λ(B) = M˜
d1
d′1
(3.1)
Equation 3.1 is used to get the rush in triaging of bugs λ(B). The ratio is
retrieved by dividing the median of actual triage duration (b, d1) ∈ τ1 to the
median of precise measured triage duration of the bugs (b, d′1) ∈ τ ′1.
The median duration is chosen for calculating the ratio because there can be
outliers that distort the average of the data points.
Formally, the hypothesis 1 is restated as the set of security bugs Bs and
non-security bugs Bs¯, λ(Bs) < λ(Bs¯).
3.5 Applying the rush metric to the case stud-
ies
In this section, the technique to measure rush is applied to case studies and
values of rush are statistically tested.
3.5.1 Application of the technique
The median value of rush in the triaging of CVE relevant bugs for Samba,
Mozilla Firefox , Red Hat , FreeBSD and Mozilla case studies is 0.002, 0.0042,
0.024, 0.002 and 0.0017 respectively. On the the other hand, the median value
of rush in the triaging of non-CVE relevant bugs for the above case studies
in the same order is 0.088, 0.0044, 0.091, 0.5023 and 0.0369 respectively.
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Graphically, the values of rush are represented in Figure 3.7. In the figure 3.7,
the y-axis represents the median value of rush in days and the name of case
studies are shown at the x-axis. The bar charts with dark red color represents
CVE relevant and the bar charts with blue color represents the Non-CVE
relevant bugs in figure 3.7.
The results of all these case studies shows that there is a rush in the triaging
of CVE relevant bugs compared to the non-CVE relevant bugs. Hence, one
can draw conclusion that security bugs are rushed during triaging in the
above case studies. The successful application of the technique to measure
rush the time management behaviour of software developers is answering
the first part (RQ1.1) of research question RQ1. Apart from the obvious
difference between the rush values of CVE and Non-CVE bugs, one may also
observe that FreeBSD has least median rush ratio for non-CVE bugs. One
possible explanation is that the enterprise vendors behind Samba, Mozilla
Firefox ,Mozilla and Red Hat might give their developers more pressure in
resolving bugs in general. Despite from this, it worth noting that FreeBSD
has the tightest rush ratio for the CVE bugs. A possible reason is that
FreeBSD products include primarily a dependable operating system that is
more sensitive to security breaches. In contrast, Red Hat and Mozilla Firefox
maintains many lines of products that may not be all as sensitive to security
as its Enterprise Linux product line.
3.5.2 Statistical verification of the results
To statistically verify the rush in triaging of security bugs for all the case
studies, the non-parametric Mann Whitney U-test has bee applied the CVE
and non-CVE relevant bugs of all the case studies. The parametric and
non-parametric are two types of statistical tests available to verify the sam-
ples from the population of data. Usually, the parametric tests are used
for the data when the assumptions are made about the parameters of the
population’s data distribution. However, no assumptions are made in the
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Figure 3.7: Rush in the triaging of CVE and Non-CVE bugs in the case
studies for the Samba, Mozilla Firefox ,Red Hat , FreeBSD , Mozilla.
non-parametric category of statistical tests about the distribution of data.
In other words using the parametric test, difference between the populations
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is determined based on the assumption that the data is normally distributed.
But no assumptions are made on the population of data while using the non-
parametric test. Usually, the standard Quintile Regression (QQ-plot) is used
to determine the distribution of data. The rule is that in case the data is
symmetric and plots on the straight line then data is normally distributed.
The QQ-plot has been drawn for the security and non-security bugs of all
the case studies. The results showed that the security and non-security bugs’
data is not normally distributed. Therefore, the non-parametric category of
statistical tests has been chosen to evaluate the difference between the sam-
ples of all the case studies.
In the non-parametric category of statistical tests, the Mann Whitney U-test
is used to evaluate the difference between the population of two independent
data sets based on their median values Kasuya (2001). In our case, the CVE
relevant bugs are different from the non-CVE bugs, which means both data
sets are different from each other. Therefore, the Mann Whitney U-test has
been chosen to evaluate whether the values of rush for security bugs for all
the case-studies are significantly different from the non-CVE relevant bugs
for all the case studies.
The results of statistical test showed that the security bugs are rushed in
the Red Hat , FreeBSD and Mozilla case studies with the statistical signifi-
cance. However, the Samba and Mozilla Firefox case studies are inclusive.
Our results are based on the probability significance p− value obtained us-
ing the Mann Whitney U-test as described below. The p − values of Red
Hat , FreeBSD , Mozilla, Samba and Mozilla Firefox are 0.00001, .000, and
.001, 0.008291, 0.692843 respectively. The results of statistical test proves
that statistically there is a rush in the triaging of CVE bugs compared to
the Non-CVE bugs. The purpose of bug triaging is to prioritise and assign
bugs to the developers for fixing. Therefore, the statistical results verify that
security bugs are rushed to triage, which is one of the reasons of their pre-
mature assignment and subsequently reopening. The calculation of rush on
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the triaging of bugs considers the first reporting time-stamp and last assign-
ment time-stamps. In this way a bug which reopens and reassigns is also
considered in the calculation of rush. Therefore, the conclusion about the
reopening of bugs is based on the values of rush. The statistical results of
rush answers the second part (RQ1.2) of the first research question RQ1.
The statistical significance results for all the cases studies (Samba, Mozilla
Firefox , Red Hat , FreeBSD and Mozilla) are shown in Figure 3.8, 3.9, 3.10,
3.11 and 3.12 respectively. The each above figure is an output for the statis-
tical test Mann Whitney U-test showing two tables. The first table explains
the number of bugs belonging to CVE and Non-CVE groups and their values
of mean rank and sum of ranks. In the group column of first table, the first
row 1.0 represents the CVE bugs and the second number 2.0 represents the
Non-CVE group of bugs. The second column is representing the number of
bugs in each group (CVE and Non-CVE) respectively. For example, the first
row of second column is representing that there are 9 CVE bugs in the Samba
case study. On the other hand, the second row is representing that there are
1702 Non-CVE bugs in the Samba case study as shown in Figure 3.8. The
third column of the first table is representing the mean rank for the CVE
and Non-CVE bugs. For example in the case of Samba case study, the mean
rank of CVE bugs is 422.33 and Non-CVE 858.29 respectively as shown in
Figure 3.8. The forth column of the first table is representing the sum of
ranks for CVE and Non-CVE bugs. For example, the sum of ranks for the
CVE bugs is 3801.00 and for the Non-CVE bugs is 1460815.00 as shown in
the first and second row of table in Figure 3.8.
The second table shows the derived statistics of λ values. In the table, the
row with the “Mann-Whitney U ” represents the difference between the totals
of CVE and non-CVE relevant bugs. The row “Wilcoxon W ” represents the
ranked sum of the smaller sample size of the data, which is security bugs for
our case studies. The row “Z ” represents the z-values for each case study.
Usually, the “z-value” can be used to reject the null hypothesis instead of the
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p-value. However, the p-value has been used in the analysis which represents
by Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) row. The definition of p-value is given in Appendix
5.2
Figure 3.8: The results of Mann Whitney U-test for Samba case study from
SPSS package.
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Figure 3.9: The results of Mann Whitney U-test for Mozilla Firefox case
study from SPSS package.
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Figure 3.10: The results of Mann Whitney U-test for Red Hat case study
from SPSS package.
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Figure 3.11: The results of Mann Whitney U-test for FreeBSD case study
from SPSS package.
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Figure 3.12: The results of Mann Whitney U-test for Mozilla case study from
SPSS package.
3.6 Tool Support
To answer the first research question (RQ1) for measuring rush on the triag-
ing of bugs, an automated tool has been developed. The tool has two com-
ponents “Data Extraction” and “Data Analysis”.
Data Extraction: In the data extraction, the first phase is to extract the
bug ids from the Bugzilla live system by conducting a query based advance
search. The query based search has been conducted to find-out the CVE and
non-CVE relevant bug ids for extracting the bug reports later in the second
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phase of data extraction. The CVE relevant bug ids has been retrieved by
using the keyword “CVE-”. On the other hand, no keyword has been used to
retrieve the list of all the bugs. The searched bugs has been downloaded in
the comma-separated values (CSV) format. There is a possibility that some
CVE relevant bugs might exists in the list of all the bugs. Therefore, the
difference of the list of CVE and all the bugs has been taken to filter out the
CVE bugs from the list of all the bugs. After the filtration of CVE bugs from
the list of all the bugs, the list of all the bugs has been considered as non-CVE
relevant bugs. In the second phase of data extraction, the bug reports and
their associated bug activity reports relevant to CVE and non-CVE bug ids
has been retrieved. For retrieving the bug reports, the automated script A.1
has been used. On the other hand, for retrieving the associated activity
reports with the bug reports A.2 has been used. The bug reports have been
processed to get the reported, assigned and resolved time-stamps of bugs.
The scripts A.3 and A.4 has been used for retrieving the bug time stamps
data. Each script has been explained in detail in the appendix A.
Data Analysis: The date and time of reported, assigned and resolved time-
stamps of bugs has been collected separately during the data extraction.
Therefore, first the date and time of bug reported, assigned and resolved
time-stamps combined together before further pre-processing. After that all
the time-stamps has been stored in the set of bug event-stamps using the Al-
gorithm 2. The set of bug event-stamps contains the time-stamps when each
bug is reported, assigned and resolved. After getting the bug event-stamps,
the Algorithm 3 has been used to get the actual triaging and fixing durations
of bugs. As rush is the ratio of actual triage duration and the theoretical
triage duration (time developers have to delay the fixes until the next regular
release). Therefore, to calculate the theoretical triage duration, the weekly
release dates of each bug has been calculated using the Algorithm 4. Then,
the theoretical triage duration has been calculated using the Algorithm 5.
After these pre-processing steps to calculate the actual and theoretical triage
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durations, the rush has been calculated by taking the ratio of actual and
theoretical triage durations for each bug. Finally, to compare the rush on
the triaging of CVE and non-CVE bugs for each case study, the median rush
has been taken using the Equation 3.1.
Advantages and the limitations of the tool:
The following are advantages of the tool to measure ’rush’ in the triaging of
bugs.
• The algorithms for data extraction and analysis phase has been pro-
vided. Therefore, it is easier to apply the technique to measure rush to
the more case studies. It also makes easier to repeat the case studies
conducted in this thesis to confirm the results.
• The data extraction phase of the tool is fully automated and the AWK
scripts to extract the bug reports has been provided in Appendix A.
The following are limitations of the tool to measure ’rush’ in the triaging of
bugs.
• The human involvement is necessary for searching the bug ids from
Bugzilla live systems during the data extraction phase.
• For some of the case studies, e.g. Mozilla, the Bugzilla live systems
has limitation to show the number of search records. Therefore, there
is a possibility of missing some bug reports during the data extraction
phase.
• For some of the case studies, e.g Mozilla Firefox , the Bugzilla live
systems has limitation to show the number of search records on the
screen, therefore a manual yearly search is needed to find the yearly
records of data and then such yearly records are integrated.
3.7 Threats to Validity
The following validity threats to this empirical case study has been discussed.
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Internal Validity: The collected data is based on what an external de-
veloper could gather. The decision to label security bugs depends on the
external security experts who maintain the CVE database for the public,
while the developers inside each team must decide for themselves whether
they have fixed these high-profile security problems. The number of CVE
bugs (9, 14, 22) for the Samba, Mozilla Firefox and Mozilla case studies are
comparatively smaller than the Non-CVE bugs (1702, 31444, 219) respec-
tively. One can argue that the CVE and Non-CVE bugs are not comparable
in terms of the number of bugs. Therefore, the median value of rush is taken
to counter this threat to validity.
Construct Validity: The rush measurement approach is repeatable for the
other open-source projects as long as they use Bugzilla to report bugs.
However, the algorithms for the measurement of rush are applicable to the
bug duration data set of any issue tracking system. All the five vendors in
the study have security sensitive products, their Bugzilla data sets have
different number of CVE-related bugs. Also due to the difference in docu-
menting the status and time-stamps of the bugs, not all of their bugs are
sampled to compute the rush ratio. However, it is sufficient to draw mean-
ingful conclusions for checking the hypothesis.
In this study, rush the time management behaviour of software developers
is measured by calculating the time spent by them to assign the bugs. To
measure rush, the past data of bug assignment by the software developer
is used. Therefore, one can argue about the validity of results due to the
lack of the direct involvement of software developers in the study. Usually,
there is is no control on the developers in the open source projects because
they work on voluntary basis. Therefore, confirming the results of study
by involving software developers is the out of scope of this study. But the
technique to measure rush is well explained in this thesis. Therefore, the
other researchers can easily repeat this study to verify the results. Taking
the opinion of software developers about the results of this study is one of
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the future works.
External Validity: This study intends to measure rush the time manage-
ment behaviour of software developer for the security and non-security bugs.
However, different bug reporting systems have different mechanism of tagging
the bugs as security and non-security relevant. There was a risk that wrong
tagging of bugs as either security and non-security related can pollute the
results. Therefore, we have used the CVE and Non-CVE confirmed security
and non-security bugs to measure rush.
In this thesis, five different security critical case studies has been conducted
to measure rush the time management behaviour of software developers.
Therefore, there is sufficient evidence about generalising the conclusion that
statistically rush is one of the reasons of security bugs premature assignment
and subsequently reopening.
3.8 Summary
In this Chapter, one of the contributions of this thesis “a technique to mea-
sure rush the time management behaviour of software developers” has been
introduced. The technique to measure rush is based on the concept of deliv-
ering bug fixes in the weekly releases. The technique is applied to the five
case studies Samba,Mozilla Firefox , Red Hat , FreeBSD and Mozilla. The
median value of rush on the triaging of CVE and Non-CVE bugs has been
calculated. It is found that the median ’rush’ on the triaging of CVE bugs
is higher for all the case studies compared to the Non-CVE bugs. To further
statistically verify the null hypothesis 1, the Mann Whitney U-test has been
applied on the median values of rush for all the case studies. The results of
test shows that statistically security bugs are triaged in a rush in Red Hat ,
FreeBSD and Mozilla case studies. However, there is no statistical significant
difference between the rush values of CVE and Non-CVE bugs for the Samba
and Mozilla Firefox case studies.
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As in this thesis the CVE bugs are used as the representative of security
bugs and the Non-CVE bugs as the representative of Non-security bugs.
Therefore, based on the results of statistical test, the null hypothesis1 has
been rejected for the three case studies Red Hat , FreeBSD and Mozilla.
Table 3.1: Gaps filled by answering the first research
question (RQ1).
Gap reference Gap How the gap is filled
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SB1
There is a need to investigate
whether rush by the software
developers on the triaging of
security bugs is one of the rea-
sons of their premature assign-
ment and then frequent re-
opening.
The purpose of bug triaging
is to assign bugs to the other
developers for fixing. There-
fore, if a bug reopens it means
the bug also need to reassign
for fixing. In fact, the re-
assignment of a bug leads to
the longer triage duration. In
this study, rush is defined as
the ratio of actual and theo-
retical triage durations. The
shorter triage duration means
less rush and on the other hand
longer triage duration means
more rush. This study has
found that the statistical value
of rush of security bugs for the
Red Hat , FreeBSD and Mozilla
case studies is higher than the
non-security bugs. Therefore,
in this study the conclusion is
drawn from the finding that se-
curity bugs reopens more of-
ten because of rush by the soft-
ware developers on the triag-
ing in Red HatFreeBSD and
Mozilla case studies. There-
fore, this gap has been filled by
the study.
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BR1
There is a need to quantita-
tively analyse how the devel-
opers triage bugs during their
resolution.
This study has measured rush
by calculating the duration
spent by developers on triag-
ing. However, quantitative
analysis can be done on the
different aspects of bug triag-
ing. Therefore, this gap has
partially filled by this study.
BR2
There is a need to measure
rush during bug triaging con-
sidering the practical handling
of bugs by the software devel-
opers near to the release dead-
lines.
In this study, the rush is
defined as a ratio of actual
and theoretical triage dura-
tions. The theoretical triage
duration consider the time de-
velopers have to delay the as-
signment of a bug fix in the
weekly release. Therefore, this
study has filled this gap.
SD1
There is a need to measure
rush the time management be-
haviour of software developers
on the triaging of bugs
This study has measured rush
the time management be-
haviour of software developers
on the triaging of bugs. There-
fore, this gap has been filled by
this study.
SD2
There is a need to verify
whether rush the time man-
agement behaviour of software
developers on the triaging of
bugs can be measured by cal-
culating the time spent by
them on bug assignment.
This study has measured rush
by the software developers by
calculating the time spent by
them on the assignment of
bugs. Therefore, this study
has filled this.
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SD3
There is a need to verify
whether rush the time man-
agement behaviour of soft-
ware developers can be one of
the reasons of premature bug
assignment and subsequently
their reopening.
This gap is related to the gap
SB1.
SA1
There is a need to extract the
bug status time stamps when
the bug is reported till it is as-
signed to developers for mea-
suring rush the time manage-
ment behaviour of developers
on bug triaging.
In this study, the bug sta-
tus time-stamps has been ex-
tracted from the time when the
bug is reported till it is as-
signed to developers for mea-
suring rush the time manage-
ment behaviour of software de-
velopers. Therefore, this study
has filled this gap.
SA2
There is a need to extract the
bug time stamps considering
the reopening time of bugs.
In this study, the status time-
stamp of a bug is extracted
when the bug is first reported
and last assigned, which in-
clude the reopen time stamp as
well. Therefore, this study has
filled this gap.
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Chapter 4
Measuring Code Complexity
The previous chapter reports that on average a security bug is triaged in
a rush compared to an average bug. However, the rush in the triaging of
security bugs does not mean that such types of bug are simpler or easier to
fix. The real time developers spend on such types of bug may vary and is
very difficult to know and measure. Another way to know that such types of
bug are easier or complex to fix is to measure their code complexity.
There are many ways to measure the complexity of code, ranging from simple
SLOC to McCabe. Concerning changes, however, it is not clear whether
touching one line of code is more complex than touching another, and whether
the change to the control flow is indeed more complex than a change that
does not introduce new control flows. Estimating the best complexity metric
is beyond the scope of this thesis. Our aim is to obtain measurements that
are suitable for verifying the hypothesis. Since the focus of this thesis is on
security bugs, a metric based on the evidence that security aspects tend to
crosscut many functions, and therefore have more fan-ins (Marin et al., 2004)
is chosen for measuring complexity of security bugs in this thesis. Based on
the literature evidence, the hypothesis is that security bug fixes also may
touch more functions and have larger fan-ins.
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RQ2: How can the complexity of a bug fix be measured from the code
repositories? Is the complexity of a security bug fix higher on average
than the complexity of a non-security bug?
In order to address the “how” part of RQ2, a technique to measure fan-ins of
functions relevant to bug fixes is developed and explained in this Chapter.
On the other hand, to address the “yes and no” part of the RQ2, the following
null hypothesis is derived from the RQ2.
Hypothesis 2 On average the fan-in of changed functions in the patches of
security bugs is not higher than the fan-in of changed functions in the patches
of Non-security bugs.
4.1 Extracting Call Graph of the System
In order to check the above hypothesis, there is a need to compute the fan-in
of all the functions, and then the fan-in of changed functions by obtaining
first a call graph. Formally, a call graph as a directed graph is represented
by G =< V,E >, where V is a set of functions, and E is the call relationship
between a calling function to a “callee” function as shown in Definition 8.
Definition 8 Directed graph G =< V,E >: A digraph is a type of graph
to represent the objects in a specific order, where objects are referred to as
nodes and their ordered pairs of nodes are referred to as edges. Usually, it is
represented as G =< V,E >, where V = {vi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n∧ n ∈ N} is a set of
vertices and E = {(vi, vj) | 1 ≤ i, j ≤ |V | ∧ i, j ∈ N} is a set of edges. Here
N is the set of natural numbers.
The Samba case study is implemented in C/C++ language. To obtain the
call graph for such a system, A Google search has been conducted to find
static source code analysis tools for C-program. For example, keywords such
as “C fan-in analysis tools”, “call graph tools” and “C static source code
analysis tools” are used. The keyword “call graph tools” returned link to
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the stack overflow forum (In Orbit, 2011) for obtaining the call graphs of C-
programs. In this link, a list of tools to obtain the call graph is provided that
includes Egypt as well. Our purpose is to conduct the source code analysis
of security bugs. Therefore, it is found that Egypt is useful in comparison to
the others tools because it is a Perl script to integrate the GCC compiler for
source code analysis and graphviz to generate the call graph. However, it only
used to study the source code analysis instead of generating the graph. The
further introduction of Egypt and details about its functions are available on
its home page1. Finally, Egypt has been selected to fit our purpose.
4.2 Computing Fan-in of Functions
The purpose of obtaining a call graph is to compute the fan-in of functions.
Formally, fan-in is defined in Definition 9.
Definition 9 Fan in, Fv The number of times a function is invoked by the
other functions is called its fan-in. On the call graph, fan-ins are the in-
degree of nodes, denoted by the following mapping set: Fv = {(v, |Cv|) | v ∈
V ∧ C = {v′ | (v′, v) ∈ E}}.
To automatically compute the fan-in of all the functions, Algorithm 6 is
used. The call graph G < V,E > is the input, where V is the set of functions
representing each node of the call graph, and E is the set of edges representing
the ordered pairs of calling and callee functions. The edge set {(i, j)} is used
to represent the index of functions, where i represents the calling function
(predecessor) and j represents the callee function (successor). The output is
the set of changed functions Fv, which is the Cartesian product of the set
of functions V and their fan-in is represented by |Cv|. Cv is a set of callers
of the functions v. The procedure starts by initialising the output changed
function set Fv to the empty set. Then it computes all the callers for each
function v and assigns to the set of the caller functions Cv. In Line 4 of the
1http://www.gson.org/egypt/egypt.html
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procedure, the callee function v and the cardinality value of its caller set Cv
are a pair assigned to the output changed function set Fv.
Data: A digraph G =< V,E >, where the set of vertices
V = {vi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n ∧ n ∈ N} and the set of edges
E = {(vi, vj) | 1 ≤ i, j ≤ |V | ∧ i, j ∈ N}. Here N is the set of
natural numbers.
Result: Fv = {(v, |Cv|) | v ∈ V ∧ Cv = {v′ | (v′, v) ∈ E}}
1 Fv = {};
2 foreach v ∈ V do
3 Cv = {v′ | (v′, v) ∈ E};
4 Fv = F ∪ {(v, |Cv|)};
5 end
Algorithm 6: ComputeFan-In: Compute the fan-in of nodes functions
from the call graph.
The distribution of fan-ins of all the functions in the Samba case study are
shown in Figure 4.1. A total of 2553 functions’ fan-in is obtained from the
release 3.6.12. Most functions have fan-in in the range of 1 to 2, and there
is no function with zero fan-in because all such functions from the output
of Egypt have been filtered out. In the figure 4.1, the y-axis represents
the frequency of fan-ins of functions in the Samba case study. The a-axis
represents the ranges of fa-in. The range of fan-in starts from (1 to 10). One
can observe from the figure that the most functions’ fan-in lies in the range
of (1 to 10).
4.3 Extracting Changed Functions Relevant
to Bugs
When a bug is fixed, the change happens to the code that directly reflects
in the functions of the system. However, computing the fan-ins of all the
functions does not tell us anything about the changes in functions in response
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Figure 4.1: The distributions of the fan-ins among functions.
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to the bug fix. To verify our hypothesis for the changed functions, the change
functions need to be obtained first by taking into account the difference of
the two patches. Hence, the set of all the Samba patches is required to get the
changed functions. The following procedure describes how the set of patches
in the Samba case study has been obtained. Another case study may involve
different change management systems, but the data extract steps should be
similar. The git version control system is used by the Samba development
team to keep track of changes made to the code, which maintains a commit
log whenever a fix to buggy code is patched. One can obtain commit logs
from git repository using the git command as discussed below and the set
of patches can be obtained from the commit logs. In general, the patches are
defined in Definition 10.
Definition 10 Patches : P and Commit logs : L. A set of patches P is
defined as: P = {p | contains(L, “commit′′+p.id)} where L is the set of logs
of a git repository.
The set of patches is obtained from Algorithm 7. The log output from the
git repository is the input, and a set of patches is its output. The proce-
dure starts by initialising the set p to the empty set. The condition that a
line starts with the “commit” and has a commit id is checked using regular
expressions. When the condition is true, the whole line splits by the string
“commit” and returns the first element as the patch id into the variable p.
In the last step at Line 5, the commit id is stored as the set of patches by
the end of the procedure.
90
Data: L: the log output from a git repository obtained by the
command git log
Result: P = {p | contains(L, “commit′′ + p.id)}
1 P = {} ;
2 foreach line ∈ L do
3 if contains(line , ”ˆcommit) then
4 p = split(line , “commit′′)[1];
5 P = P ∪ {p};
6 end
7 end
Algorithm 7: ObtainPatches: Obtaining the list of patches.
Now, getting the changed functions it is possible that one can retrieve the set
of patches. To get changed functions, the git diff command is used to get
the change set ∆ by taking the difference of two patches. From each change
set, the list of changed functions can be retrieved. The patch p and changed
functions Vp are defined in Definition 11.
Definition 11 Patch : p , and Changed functions : Vp. A patch is defined as
a set of changes to the program: p = {∆} where ∆ is a change. Every patch
p can be identified by a hexadecimal number id, denoted by p.id. Usually a
patch happens as the result of a bug fix. The set of functions changed by a
patch p are denoted as Vp = {v | v ∈ V ∧ contains(∆, v) ∧∆ ∈ p}. Here V
is the set of functions already defined in Definition 8.
In Algorithm 8, the list of changed functions is obtained. The patch p is the
input and the set of changed functions Vp is the output. The patch p is a set
of changes ∆ obtained by taking the difference of two patches pi and pj. Each
element of the changed functions set Vp belongs to ∆ and the set of functions
V . The patch p is collected using the git diff id..id^ command, where
the id of each commit is provided to git to know the difference between two
patches. The procedure starts by initialising the set of changed functions Vp
to the empty set. Then for each change ∆ belonging to p and each function v
belonging to functions set V , the condition if ∆ contains v is checked. When
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the condition is true, the function v is added to the set of changed functions
Vp.
Data: p = {∆} : a patch is a set of code changes id obtained using
the command git diff id..id^ , V : the set of functions
Result: Vp = {v | v ∈ V ∧ contains(∆, v) ∧∆ ∈ p}
1 Vp = {};
2 foreach ∆ ∈ p , v ∈ V do
3 if contains(∆ , v) then
4 Vp = Vp ∪ {v};
5 end
6 end
Algorithm 8: ObtainChangedFunctions:Obtaining the list of changed
functions from a patch.
4.4 Computing Fan-in of Changed Functions
Relevant to Bugs
Until now for the Samba case study the set of patches P and changed func-
tions Vp has been obtained. In order to know the patches which have high
fan-in changed functions relevant to a bug, the relationship between a patch
and the changed functions has to be analysed. Therefore, getting the accu-
mulative fan-in of all the changed functions inside all the patches will help
to know which patches have high fan-in changed functions. The indication
of high fan-in changed functions inside a patch tells us that a patch code is
complex.
Formally, the accumulative fan-in of all the changed functions in a patch is
given in Definition 12.
Definition 12 The accumulative fan-ins of all the changed functions inside
all the patches: FP , and the accumulative fan-in of all the changed functions
inside a patch : fp. The set of the accumulative fan-ins of all the changed
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functions inside all the patches FP is defined as: FP = {(p,
∑
v∈Vp
Fv) | p ∈ P},
where VP is the set of changed functions, and Fv is a Cartesian product of the
set of functions and their fan-ins. The accumulative fan-in of all the changed
functions inside a patch fp is defined as: fp =
∑
v∈Vp
Fv(v).
The set of accumulative fan-ins of all the changed functions inside all the
patches is obtained using Algorithm 9. The set of changed functions fan-
ins inside the patches FP contains the pair of each patch and its fan-in. In
Algorithm 9, the set of functions’ fan-ins Fv and the set of patches P are the
input parameters. The set of functions’ fan-ins Fv is the result of applying
Algorithm 6 and the set of patches P is the results of applying Algorithm 7.
The procedure starts by initialising the set of the changed functions’ fan-ins
inside the patches FP to the empty set. This set is the Cartesian product
of patches and their fan-ins. Then for each patch p belonging to the set of
patches P , the value of the set of changed functions Vp is obtained using
Algorithm 8. Line 6 is aggregating the fan-ins of all the changed functions
inside each patch for the given function v. Here, the function v belongs to
the set of changed functions Vp and is assigned to the accumulative fan-in of
changed functions inside a patch fp.
Line 7 inside the loop is used to store the patch p and the sum of the fan-
ins of changed functions fp into the Cartesian product of patches and their
changed functions’ fan-ins FP .
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Data: Fv, P
Result: FP = {(p,
∑
v∈Vp
Fv) | p ∈ P}
1 Fv = ComputeFan− In(G);
2 P = ObtainPatches(L);
3 FP = {};
4 foreach p ∈ P do
5 Vp = ObtainChangedFunctions(p);
6 fp =
∑
v∈Vp
Fv(v);
7 FP = FP ∪ {(p, fp)};
8 end
Algorithm 9: ComputeOverallFan-in: Compute the accumulative fan-in
of all the functions inside a patch.
The accumulative fan-ins of all the changed functions inside all the patches
FP has been calculated. Now one can find the bugs relevant to the set of
patches to know whether the changed functions of patches relevant to bugs
have higher fan-in. Therefore, the Cartesian product of the set of bugs and
patches is required, which is formally defined in Definition 13.
Definition 13 The set of bugs : B, and The set of bugs and their corre-
sponding patches : BP . The set of bugs B is defined as B = {b | b =
matcher(L(p), regex)}.
In this set, the regex is . ∗ [ˆa− z](bug|fix|correct)\\D ∗ (\\d+).∗ with b
being \\(d+) group1. The matcher is a function to match the regular expres-
sion with the given pattern. The Cartesian product of B and patches P is
defined as BP = {(b, p) | b ∈ B ∧ p ∈ P}.
The set of bugs and their corresponding patches are obtained using Algo-
rithm 10. Here, the set of logs output L from all the branches in git repos-
itory is the input parameter. The output is BP . The procedure starts by
initialising the value of BP to the empty set, then for each line of code be-
longing to the corresponding patch L(p), and for each patch p belonging to
the set of patches P . The regular expression in the line line is matched with
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the bug id b. If the regular expression matches the value of bug b and patch
p are added as an element to the set of bugs and their corresponding patches
BP .
Data: L: the log output from a git repository obtained by the
command git log
Result: BP = {(b, p) | b ∈ B ∧ p ∈ P}, where
B = {b | b = matcher(L(p), regex)} in which
regex = . ∗ [ˆa− z](bug|fix|correct)
\\D ∗ (\\d+). ∗ withbbeing\\(d+)group1
1 BP = {};
2 foreach p ∈ P do
3 foreach line ∈ L(p) do
4 if containPatterns(line, b, regex) then
5 BP = BP ∪ {(b, p)};
6 end
7 end
8 end
Algorithm 10: ObtainBugs’Patches: Obtain the list of bugs and their
corresponding patches in which they are fixed.
After applying Algorithm 10, the set of bugs and their corresponding patches
BP and the set of accumulative fan-in of changed functions inside the patches
FP has been collected. In Samba it is observed that the fix to each bug can
be patched in one or multiple patches. Therefore, to know how many bugs
have high fan-in changed functions it is required to obtain the accumulative
fan-ins of all the changed functions inside all the patches relevant to the bug
fix. Formally, the accumulative fan-ins of changed functions inside all the
patches relevant to a bug fix is given in Definition 14.
Definition 14 The set of fan-ins of all the changed functions inside all
the patches relevant to the bugs :FB, and the accumulative fan-in of all the
changed functions inside all the patches relevant to a bug : fb. The Cartesian
product of bugs and their relevant patches’ changed functions fan-ins is de-
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fined as FB = {(b, fb) | b ∈ Bp∧fb = fb+Fp.get(p)}, where fb is the fan-in of
changed functions inside all the patches relevant to a bug. The fb is obtained
by summing the changed functions fan-ins of all the patches corresponding to
a bug.
Algorithm 11 is used to obtain the changed functions fan-ins of all the patches
relevant to the bugs. The Cartesian product of patches and their changed
functions fan-in Fp and the Cartesian product of bugs and their corresponding
patches BP are input. The output is the fan-in of changed functions inside
the patches relevant to the bug fixes FB as defined in Definition 14. The
procedure starts by obtaining the values of Fp and BP from Algorithms 9
and 10 respectively. In Line 3, the value of FB is initialised to the empty
set. Then for each value of the bug b belonging to the BP , the fan-ins of
changed functions inside the patches relevant to a bug fix fb are initialised
to zero. Since each bug might have multiple patches, a “for” loop is used to
iterate all the patches P in the FP relevant to the bug b. At each iteration the
changed functions’ fan-in of each patch is added to fb to get the accumulative
changed functions’ fan-in of all the patches relevant to the bug b. Finally,
the pair of bug b and its fan-in fb are added to the FB.
Data: Fp, BP
Result: FB = {(b, fb) | b ∈ BP ∧ fb = fb + Fp.get(p)}
1 Fp = ComputeAccumulativeFanin(Fv, P );
2 BP = ObtainBugs
′Pastches(L);
3 FB = {};
4 foreach b ∈ BP do
5 fb = 0;
6 foreach p ∈ Fp do
7 fb = fb + Fp.get(p);
8 end
9 FB = FB ∪ {(b, fb)};
10 end
Algorithm 11: ObtainBugsFanin: Obtain the fan-in of all the bugs.
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After obtaining the set of changed functions’ fan-ins inside all the patches
relevant to the bugs, one can get the average fan-in of changed functions
inside all the patches relevant to security and all the bugs. The average
changed functions fan-in inside all the patches relevant to all the bugs is
given in Definition 15.
FB = ObtainBugsFanin(FP , BP ) // write about this equation
Definition 15 Given the set of bugs B, and their average fan-in f¯B, the
average fan-in is defined as. The average fan-in of all the bugs f¯B is defined
as f¯B =
∑
b∈FB
fb/|FB|.
f¯B =
∑
b∈FB
fb/|B| (4.1)
It is not possible to verify our hypothesis for security and non-security bugs by
only calculating the average fan-ins of non-security bugs. Therefore, the se-
curity bugs are defined in Definition 16. The security bugs are retrieved from
the Samba security releases web-page http : //www.samba.org/samba/history/security.html.
At the time of study, only 14 of the retrieved CVE relevant bugs have
Bugzilla entries. In these 14-bugs, the patches of 9 bugs are available in
the Samba git repository.
Definition 16 The set of given security bugs BS, The fan-in of a security
bug fbs, and The average fan-in of security bugs f¯BS . For this algorithm, the
security bugs are already given. The average fan-in of security bugs f¯BS is
defined as f¯BS =
∑
bs∈BS
fbs/|BS|.
¯fBS =
∑
bs∈BS
fbs/|BS| (4.2)
Formally, the null hypothesis 2 is restated as f¯B > ¯fBS .
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4.5 Applying the fan-in metric to the case
studies
The technique to measure fan-in complexity of functions relevant to CVE
and Non-CVE bugs has been applied to two case studies Samba and Mozilla
Firefox . In the Samba case study, the average fan-ins of CVE bugs is ¯fBS =
26.42 and average fan-ins of Non-CVE bugs is f¯BS¯ = 8.39. In the Mozilla
Firefox case study, the average fan-ins of CVE bugs is ¯fBS = 4.5 and the
average fan-ins of Non-CVE bugs is f¯BS¯ = 0.44478723. Graphically, the
average fan-in values of CVE and Non-CVE bugs are presented in Figure 4.2.
In the figure, the y-axis represents the average fan-in values and the name
of case studies are presented on the x-axis. The bar chart with red color
represents the CVE relevant bugs and the bar chart with blue color represents
the Non-CVE relevant bugs. By applying the technique to measure fan-in
complexity of functions relevant to bug fixes. The first part (RQ2.1) of the
second research question (RQ2) has been answered.
The results of case studies shows that on average a CVE bugs has higher fan-
in compared to the Non-CVE bugs in the Samba and Mozilla Firefox case
studies. Based on the fan-ins comparisons of CVE and Non-CVE relevant
bugs. It is concluded that the null hypothesis 2 is rejected that on average the
fan-in of security bugs is lower than the non-security bugs. One can conclude
from these results that on average security bugs are more complex to fix than
the other bugs in Samba and Mozilla Firefox case studies. By comparing the
fan-ins complexity results of CVE and Non-CVE bug fixes, the second part
(RQ2.2) of the second research question RQ2 has been answered.
There is a difference in the fan-in results of Samba and Mozilla Firefox case
studies. A possible explanation of the lower fan-in of Mozilla Firefox case
study is that there a lot of patches delivered for the purpose of regression
testing. Therefore, in fact there are no function changes in such patches.
Another possible reason is that there is a less trace-ability between the bug
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Figure 4.2: The average fan-in of Samba and Mozilla Firefox case studies.
ids and code patches in the case of Mozilla Firefox case study.
4.6 Tool Support
To answer the second research question (RQ2) for measuring the complexity
of functions relevant to bug fixes an automated tool has been developed. The
tool has two components “Data Extraction” and “Data Analysis”.
Data Extraction: In the data extraction, the first phase is to download and
build the code of the system. To download and build the code of the system,
the instructions given for the development of open source system has been
used. For example, the instructions for the Samba’s developers on their wiki
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to “Build Samba” 2 and “Contribute to Samba” 3 has been used to download
and build the code of the Samba system. The Samba system has been build
by creating the clone of its code base in the git version control system. In
the second phase of data extraction, the call graph of the Samba system has
been collected from the branches of git version control system. The steps to
extract the call graph has been described in Appendix A.5. The call graph
of Samba contains information about which function is calling which other
function in the system.
Data Analysis: In the data analysis, the first step is to measure the fan-in
of all the functions in the collected call graph. The fan-in of functions from
the call graph has been measured using automated program in Appendix A.5.
The call graph of the system is input of the program and the set of fan-ins of
functions Fv is its output. The next step is to collect patches delivered for the
fixing of bugs using the program in Appendix A.8. The patch commit log is
input of the program and the set of patches P is its output. After collecting
the set of patches P , the changed functions Vp has been collected by taking
the difference of patches. The program to obtain the set of changed functions
is provided in Appendix A.7. The set of patches P is input of the program
and the set of changed functions Vp is its output. In the next step, the fan-
ins of changed functions for each patch has been measured by mapping the
functions retrieved from the call graph Fv with the changed functions Vp. The
program to obtain the fan-ins of changed functions for each patch is provided
in Appendix A.9. The set of patches P and the set of changed functions Vp
are input of the program and a Cartesian product (p, fp) is output of the
program. In this Cartesian product, the fp represents the fan-in value of
changed functions corresponding to the patch p.
After getting the fan-in value of changed functions for each patch, the next
step is to look for the bugs those fix are delivered in the patches. In this
2https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/Build Samba
3https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/Contribute
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way, the bugs and their corresponding patch are collected by parsing the
commit logs. The program to obtain the set of bugs and their corresponding
patches BP is provided in Appendix A.11. The patch commit log is input of
the program and a Cartesian product (bugID, P ) is output of the program.
In this Cartesian product, the bugID represents the identifier for each bug
corresponding to the patch in which its fix is delivered. In the next step, the
fan-in value of each bug is obtained using the program in Appendix A.12. The
set of bugs and their corresponding patches BP and the Cartesian product
of the fan-in value of changed functions for each patch Fp are input of the
program. The Cartesian product of bugs and their fan-in value FB is output
of the program.
At-last, the fan-in of bugs relevant to CVE and Non-CVE is obtained using
the program in Appendix A.14. The set of bugs and their corresponding
patches FB and a file containing the list of bugs for either CVE and Non-
CVE bugs are input of the program. The output of this program is the
average fan-in value of either CVE and Non-CVE relevant bugs. As this
program is used to get the fan-in of both CVE and Non-CVE relevant bugs.
Therefore, the output of this program depends on the list of bugs in the
input file. One of the prerequisite of getting the average fan-in value for
CVE and Non-CVE bugs is to collect the CVE and Non-CVE bugs. In the
earlier chapter, it is reported that CVE and Non-CVE bugs are collected
from the Bugzilla system. Therefore, the CVE and Non-CVE bugs used for
measuring rush for the Samba and Mozilla Firefox case studies are also used
to compute the average fan-in.
Advantages and the limitation of the tool:
The following are advantages of the tool to measure ’fan-in’ complexity of
functions relevant to bug fixes.
• The algorithms for data extraction and analysis phase has been pro-
vided. Therefore, it is easier to apply the technique to measure fan-in of
functions relevant to bug fixes for the more case studies. It also makes
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easier to repeat the case studies conducted in this thesis to confirm the
results.
• The data extraction and analysis phases of the tool are fully automated
and the data analysis phase has been programmed using Java. All the
Java programs are provided in Appendix A.
The following are limitations of the tool to measure ’fan-in’ complexity of
functions relevant to bug fixes.
• The tool is taking the difference of patches to extract the changed
functions from the change set. Therefore, the calculation depends on
the availability of the patches in the commit logs.
• The tool takes into account the patches delivered for the purpose of
regression testing which might affect on the outcome of the results.
• The “program to get the list of functions from the change set” and the
program to “obtain the list of patches” might take more time for the
case studies in which the number of patches delivered are higher.
4.7 Threats to Validity
Briefly, the following threats to validity to this empirical case study has been
discussed.
Internal Validity: For the Samba case study, only 14 CVE relevant bug
reports has been found in the Bugzilla database for the Samba system at
samba.bugzilla.org. In these 14 CVE entries, only 12 bugs have correspond-
ing patches available in the git repository. The results of CVE and non-CVE
bugs are based on 12 and 1945 bugs respectively. Therefore, smaller CVE
bugs data set for comparing the fan-in values of Samba case study is one
of the validity threats. To counter this threat to validity, the technique to
measure fan-in complexity of functions relevant to bug fixes has been applied
to another case study Mozilla Firefox . To measure the complexity of func-
tions relevant to bug fixes for Mozilla Firefox case study, the 14 CVE and
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31444 Non-CVE bugs are used. However, it is found that Mozilla Firefox
does not disclose all of CVE relevant bugs in the public domain. Therefore,
it is possible that the sample size to compare the fan-in values for the both
case studies is not reflecting all the bugs. But it is sufficient enough to verify
the hypothesis.
In this study, the average fan-in complexity of functions relevant to bug fixes
has been compared. One can argue about the choice of comparing average,
well the total fan-ins by a code patch follows a normal distribution. That
means there are few outliers in the fan-in values because the complexity of
functions relevant to CVE and Non-CVE bugs is computed using the call
graph of the same system.
Construct Validity: Our complexity measurement on change impact com-
plexity using call graphs also provides a chance for objectively checking the
effort required for fixing the problems. One threat of validity is that not all
code patches are related to the bug numbers and not all fixed bug numbers
have comments in the code to indicate where their patches are. For example
in the Samba case study only 15% of code patches have their corresponding
bug id. The percentage of bug fixes with the lack of trace-ability between
the code patches for Mozilla Firefox is 40%. Although in another case study,
Yu et al. (2008) have extracted the trace-ability links between the source
code and its security design in UML sequence diagram. However, such links
cannot be used for the analysis of security bugs without an explicit UML
design model or 100% accurate bug-code trace-ability. In their book Huang
and Zisman (2012) has mentioned that managing trace-ability links between
different artefacts of the system is difficult. However, the lack of bug-code
trace-ability is still another area to work on for the research community.
Therefore, it is outside the scope of this thesis to address the risk that fan-in
computation only covers partial bugs.
External Validity: The git version control system and the open source
project for the validation of our approach has been used. Therefore, our
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approach is applicable to any open source project using git, and any other
version of control system, if they can be converted to git. There are tools
available to convert the SVN and CVS repositories into git version control
system.
In this thesis, two different security critical case studies have been conducted
to measure the fan-in complexity of functions relevant to bug fixes. Therefore,
there is sufficient evidence about generalising the conclusion that on average
a CVE bug has higher fan-in complexity compared to a Non-CVE bug.
4.8 Summary
In this Chapter, the contributions of this thesis “a technique to measure the
fan-in complexity of functions relevant to bug fixes” has been introduced.
This thesis is the first to apply the concept of fan-in to measure the bug
fix complexity. The fan-in complexity technique is applied to the two case
studies Samba and Mozilla Firefox . The average fan-in of changed functions
relevant to the bug fixes relevant to CVE and Non-CVE bugs has been com-
puted. It is found that on average the functions relevant to CVE bug fixes
has higher complexity compared to the functions relevant to the Non-CVE
bug fixes for the both case studies.
As in this thesis the CVE bugs are used as the representative of security
bugs and the Non-CVE bugs as the representative of Non-security bugs.
Therefore, by comparing the fan-in values of CVE and Non-CVE bugs, the
null hypothesis2 has been rejected for the both Samba and Mozilla Firefox
case studies.
Table 4.1: Gaps filled by answering the second research
question (RQ2).
Gap reference Gap How the gap is filled
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SB2
There is a need to investi-
gate whether security bugs are
more complex to fix compared
to the other bugs.
This study has developed a
technique to measure the com-
plexity of functions relevant to
bug fixes. The technique has
been applied to two case stud-
ies Samba and Mozilla Firefox .
The comparison of both case
studies showed that security
bugs have higher complexity
compared to the non-security
bugs. There are various met-
rics to measure the complexity
of bugs as explained in the lit-
erature review section of this
thesis. However, this study
is the first to use the fan-in
complexity metric to measure
the complexity of bug fixes.
Therefore, this study has par-
tially filled this gap.
BR3
There is a need to measure the
complexity of code relevant to
bug fixes to argue that bugs
with the higher code complex-
ity are difficult to fix.
The results of fan-in complex-
ity shows that security bugs
have higher complexity. Ex-
isting studies in the literature
have reported that bugs with
the higher code complexity are
difficult to fix. This study has
provided an evidence to sup-
port this argument. Therefore,
this study has filled this gap.
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BR4
There is a need to verify that
the bugs with the higher code
complexity are more difficult
to fix using different complex-
ity metric from the fixing time.
This study has used the fan-in
complexity metric to measure
the complexity of bug fixes
rather than the fixing time.
Therefore, this study has filled
this gap.
CC1
There is a need to measure
the complexity of functions
relevant to a bug fix using
different complexity metrics
from the source lines of code
(SLOC) and cyclomatic com-
plexity (CYC).
This gap is related to the BR4.
CC2
There is a need to verify
whether functions relevant to
bug fixes have high fan-in val-
ues.
It is found in this study that
the functions relevant to secu-
rity bug fixes have higher fan-
in values. Therefore, this gap
has been filled by this study.
SA3
There is a need to extract
the changed functions from the
patches relevant to a bug fix
to measure the complexity of
functions.
In this study, the fan-in com-
plexity of functions relevant to
bug fixes by extracting the call
graph of the system. There-
fore, this study has filled this
gap.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions and Future Work
The contributions of this thesis are two folds: (i) a technique to measure
rush the time management behaviour of software developers on bug triaging
has been developed. The technique has been applied to five security critical
case studies namely Samba, Mozilla Firefox , Red Hat , FreeBSD and Mozilla.
The values of rush are tested using statistical testing to compare CVE and
Non-CVE relevant bugs. (ii) Another technique to measure the complexity
of functions relevant to bug fixes has been developed. The technique has
been applied to the Samba and Mozilla Firefox case studies to compare the
fan-in complexity of functions relevant to CVE and Non-CVE bug fixes.
The following subsections discuss the conclusions drawn from the findings
and their implications if any, the limitations of our study, and finally future
work and future vision.
5.1 Conclusions
In this study, two research questions (RQ1) and (RQ2) has been answered.
Both research questions have two parts, the first part of each research ques-
tion is answering “how” to develop the technique and the second part is
answering the “so what” part about the application of technique. The fol-
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lowing is a summary of the work.
First, a technique to measure “rush”, the time management behaviour of
software developers in the triaging of bugs has been developed. The al-
gorithms and formulas to measure “rush” in the triaging of bugs have been
provided. The technique has been applied to five case studies Samba, Mozilla
Firefox , Red Hat , FreeBSD and Mozilla. The findings of the study showed
that a CVE bug has been triaged in a “rush” by the software developers
in the above case studies compared to an average Non-CVE bug. Further,
the values of “rush” are statistically verified using the Mann-whitney U test.
The results of the test showed that the values of “rush” for CVE and Non-
CVE bugs for Red Hat , FreeBSD and Mozilla case studies are significantly
different. However, the value of “rush” for CVE and Non-CVE bugs for the
Samba and Mozilla Firefox case studies are not significantly different. Based
on these findings, it is concluded that CVE relevant bugs are triaged in a
rush in Red Hat , FreeBSD and Mozilla case studies. The ‘rush’ measure-
ment technique is useful in agile software development to determine which
bugs has been triaged in a rush.
Second, a technique to measure the complexity of functions relevant to bug
fixes using the call graph based fan-in metric has been developed. The al-
gorithms and formulas to compute the complexity of functions relevant to
bug fixes have been provided. The technique has been applied to the Samba
and Mozilla Firefox case studies. The findings show that the functions rele-
vant to a CVE bug have higher fan-in complexity compared to the functions
relevant to an average Non-CVE bug. The ‘fan-in’ complexity technique is
useful to measure the complexity of functions relevant to bug fixes.
5.2 The correctness and usefulness of find-
ings
In this section, the correctness and usefulness of findings are discussed.
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5.2.1 The Correctness of findings
In this study, two key research questions has been answered. The first re-
search question is “whether rush the time management behaviour of soft-
ware developers is one of the reasons of the premature assignment and
subsequently reopening of security bugs”. The second research question is
“whether security security bugs are complex to fix”. The two null hypoth-
esis have been developed in addition to techniques to answer the research
questions.
To verify the null hypothesis relevant to the first research question, the tech-
nique to measure rush is applied to more than one case studies. Additionally,
the null hypothesis relevant to rush (the first research question) is tested us-
ing Mann Whitney U-test. However, the outcome of empirical research using
statistical hypothesis testing can not be regarded as a proof. But based on
the probabilities, statistical testing help to support or reject a hypothesis.
On the other hand, to verify the null hypothesis relevant to the second re-
search question, the technique to measure fan-in complexity is applied to
more than one case studies (Samba and Mozilla Firefox ).
During the design of study, the same results are expected from the different
cases to reject the null hypothesis. The median value of rush for security bugs
is higher in the three case studies Red Hat , FreeBSD and Mozilla. Similarly,
the fan-in complexity of functions relevant to security fixes are higher for the
both Samba and Mozilla Firefox case studies. It mean the null hypothesis
designed in this study for measuring rush and fan-in complexity has been
rejected in more than one case studies. Therefore, the results produced by
this study are reliable and valid.
One can argue that the author of this thesis can bias the data collection
and analysis steps. Therefore, the tool kits for measuring rush and fan-in
complexity are explained, so the other researchers can repeat the study to
find the similar results.
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5.2.2 The usefulness of findings
On the basis of the findings that CVE-relevant security bugs are triaged in a
rush compared to the Non-CVE bugs, and CVE-relevant security bugs have
higher fan-in complexity compared to the Non-CVE bugs. The following are
recommendations for developers and vendors involved in the maintenance of
software systems.
Delaying the bug assignment if there is time for the next regular
release: According to the release planning model of rush ratio definition, the
observation confirms that developers rush to deliver bugs before the dead-
line of releases. It suggests that delaying the assignment of some CVE bugs
when the release planning constraints allow could help find the right de-
veloper. In practice, however, many vendor provide quick patches through
security releases immediately after a CVE bug is ‘fixed’. It would give mali-
cious attackers two advantages: (a) the bug patch may not be thorough and
complete, yet presenting an illusion of security; (b) the very announcement
of bug fix earlier than a normal weekly release may lead to extra updates
that are be mended on the regular basis unless all users accept the risk of
immediate security updates. Of course, it is not to say that vendors should
give up security releases as a best-effort workaround under difficult situations
to save their reputation. The statistical findings merely suggest that more
often than ever vendors security releases could be aligned better with the
regular releases.
Incorporating rush and fan-in complexity techniques with the de-
velopment workflow: Since it is not difficult to compute rush ratio accord-
ing to the regular release dates and the bug reports, vendors could benefit
from incorporating the metric within their development process to help as-
sess how likely a CVE bug is handled in a rush. In this way, developers
can not only estimate the time required in advance but also compare each
other to find who can benefit more from a better time management. Such an
awareness could also help the vendor in understating the reason of rushing
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and which features of the bug reports tend to cause rushing in the past. On
the other hand, incorporating fan-in technique in the development process
can help vendors in better estimation of the fixing effort. So that they can
allocate a single or team of developers on the fixing task accordingly.
Measuring the complexity of past security bug fixes to know the
complexity of newly reported similar type of bug fixes: The technique
to measure fan-in complexity of functions relevant to bug fixes is useful to
measure the complexity of past fixes. In this way, the software developers
can determine the complexity of similar type of newly reported bug fixes.
Such complexity measure can help them for better estimation about the
fixing time. The fan-in complexity will also help software developers at the
triaging stage to chose a developer based on his experience of fixing complex
bugs.
5.3 Future Work Directions
The research work presented in this thesis is extendable in the following
directions.
5.3.1 Using natural language classification technique
to retrieve security bugs
In this thesis, the CVE relevant bugs are used as the confirmed security bugs
to measure the rush and code complexity of functions relevant to bug fixes.
The CVE relevant bugs are already confirmed as the security bugs by the
security experts and people working in the security domain have a consensus
that these bugs are indeed security related. Therefore,the CVE relevant se-
curity bugs from the Samba, Mozilla Firefox , Red Hat FreeBSD and Mozilla
security release wikies and Bugzilla bug reports has been retrieved.
However, the CVE bugs are not the only security related bugs that exist in
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the system, because in the bug tracking systems the bugs are reported by
the end-users, development and testing teams etc., and usually the bugs are
labelled as security related at the time of reporting. For example, in the
Mozilla Firefox system the bug reports labelled as security are treated with
high priority Mozilla (2014). Therefore, the bug report helps to determine
whether a bug is security related based on the label assigned to the bug report
or through looking at its description. Gegick et al. (2010) have used the bug
report labels and descriptions to classify them as CVE or non-CVE related.
In this thesis that approach could have been used to retrieve the security
bugs but one of the prerequisites of applying the approach was that the bugs
should be labelled as security related. However, in the Samba system the se-
curity bugs are not labelled, and CVE relevant labelling is the most reliable
source. Another challenge was that the natural language processing approach
is not automated; therefore applying the approach to retrieve security bugs
was a challenge. Hence, the future plan is to use the natural language bug
classification approach to retrieve security bugs for future studies. Similarly,
there is an automated tool support available for the classification of bug re-
ports using the natural language technique Podgurski et al. (2003). However,
such tool support needs to be extended for classifying security related bugs.
In future, the plan is to perform disambiguation for the natural language
description of security bugs (Hui Yang et al., 2011).
5.3.2 Applying rush and code complexity measurement
approach to the other case studies
The technique to measure rush have been applied to five case studies Samba,
Mozilla Firefox , Red Hat FreeBSD and Mozilla to know whether the security
bugs are triaged in a rush. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the
first to choose the Samba case study for bug analysis, and Mozilla Firefox ,
Red Hat , FreeBSD and Mozilla case studies to measure the rush. However, a
lot of studies on bug analysis have been conducted on the Apache open source
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systems (Mockus et al., 2002). The Apache Tomcat has been widely used as
a web server to run web services for Java relevant platforms. Security is one
of the primary concerns for such a system as well. Therefore, the plan is to
apply the rush measurement technique for the other potential case studies in
the future.
The technique to measure code complexity of functions relevant to CVE bugs
have been applied to the Samba and Mozilla Firefox case studies to know
whether the functions relevant to CVE bugs have higher code complexity
compared to the other types of bug. In the future, the plan is to apply fan-in
complexity technique to the more case studies as well.
5.3.3 Confirming the rush phenomenon in the triaging
of security bugs in industrial settings
In this thesis, the rush in the triaging of CVE bugs has been measured
through mining the data from the bug repositories of Samba, Mozilla Fire-
fox ,Red Hat , FreeBSD and Mozilla open source projects. However, bug
triaging is a very human-oriented process in which a developer makes de-
cision about the assignment of a bug to the other developer for fixing and
whether there is enough information to reproduce the bug. In cases where
the developer is convinced that the reported bug is valid and cannot find
the duplicate bug then they assign it to another developer for fixing, but the
existing evidence in the literature shows that the number of reported bugs
everyday over-loads the developers for triaging in open source projects (An-
vik et al., 2005). Therefore, taking the developers’ view on the rush in the
triaging of bugs by conducting a survey is also in our list of future works.
In open source projects, software developers usually work in the distributed
teams on a voluntary basis compared to the closed source projects (Crowston
and Scozzi, 2008). Therefore, the teams working in closed source projects
face different challenges during the triaging of bugs. According to Kuan
(2004), there are different practices in place for the resolution of bugs for the
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closed source projects compared to the open source. Therefore, there is a
plan to apply the rush measurement technique to the closed source projects.
5.3.4 Measuring complexity of functions for the closed
source systems
In Chapter 4 of this thesis the complexity of functions relevant to CVE bugs
for the Samba and Mozilla Firefox open source systems has been measured.
Usually, the open source systems are considered more extensible and less
coupled due to the limited control on the quality of the development pro-
cess (Stamelos et al., 2002). Therefore, it is considered that the functions
added and modified at the time of maintenance release in a closed source
project are closely related compared to the functions added and modified
in the open source (Paulson et al., 2004). However, it is an open question
whether the coupling of systems impacts on the fan-in value of functions rel-
evant to security bugs. Hence, one of the future tasks is to apply our code
complexity approach to measuring the fan-in of functions of the closed source
projects.
The more complex code is considered harmful for the security of software
systems (Wurster and van Oorschot, 2008) and usually a lot of effort is made
to encourage software developers to write a secure code. However, how the
software developers’ code writing skills impact on the complexity of software
systems is an open question to answer, which is one of our future work
directions.
Similarly, the author of this thesis is interested in comparing the complexity
of functions for CVE bugs in the open and closed source projects. Above it
is already discussed that how both types (open and closed source) of projects
have very different development processes in place. Therefore, such an anal-
ysis will help to determine whether the different development processes also
impact on the complexity of security relevant functions. Consequently in-
creases the fix time of bugs at the maintenance stage.
114
Another future task in this direction is to analyse the developers’ personal
process of fixing security bugs in the open and closed source systems. Such
an analysis will help to prepare general guidelines for the developers during
the fixing of security bugs.
5.4 Future Vision
In response to malicious attacks, the security relevant bugs need to be re-
solved on the urgent basis to secure the software system. Therefore, resolving
security bugs during the maintenance of software system is challenging for
the software developers. To investigate the resolution of security bugs during
software maintenance, at the start of this study, a literature survey has been
conducted. Two key gaps relevant to triaging and fixing activities of security
bug resolution has been found.
A gap that security bugs are triaged faster and reopens more often relevant
to triaging activities has been found. Therefore, in this thesis, first it is
investigated whether software developers rush to resolve security bugs on the
triaging. A technique to measure rush the time management behaviour of
software developers has been developed in this study. The technique has
been applied to five case studies. Further, the rush values of security and
non-security bugs are statistically tested to evaluate their significance. The
results shows that security bugs are triaged in a rush in Red Hat , FreeBSD
and Mozilla case studies. For the expansion of rush analysis, some plans
has been discussed in the future work sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3. The plans
listed in above future work sections are more relevant to the verification of
the technique to measure rush.
On the high level, one of the follow up work is to investigate that how incorpo-
rating the rush measurement technique can help to improve the development
process. Software projects not using Bugzilla may follow somewhat different
practices in the resolution of bugs, in such cases the proposed release-planning
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based rush metric definition will have to be extended to fit for the purpose.
The current calculation is based on the CVE bugs available from bug re-
port references to the CVE entries. Different types of vulnerabilities in CVE
records such as buffer over-flow, access validation error may also have differ-
ent consequences on the security of system. Therefore, weighing in our rush
metric with the classified features of CVE bugs developers could be more
informed about what to do in the face of security attack.
Concretely, answering the following research question relevant to rush metric
will give more insight about the triaging of security bugs and its role in the
security maintenance.
How can the ‘rush’ measurement technique be used to improve the bug
triaging process?
A gap that security bugs are more complex to fix compared to the other
types of bug relevant to fixing activities has been found. Therefore, in this
thesis, it is investigated whether security bugs are more complex to fix. A
technique to measure fan-in complexity of functions relevant to bug fixes has
been developed in this study. The technique has been applied to two case
studies Samba and Mozilla Firefox . For the expansion of fan-in analysis,
some plans has been discussed in the future work section 5.3.4.The plans
listed in above future work section are more relevant to the verification of
the technique to measure fan-in complexity.
On the high level, one of the follow up work relevant to fan-in complexity
technique is to measure the fixing time of security relevant bug fixes with the
higher fan-in complexity. In this way, one can verify whether such bugs also
takes the more time of developers for fixing. The bug fix complexity is key
in determining the fixing time of bugs but the fixing complexity can only be
measured after the resolution of bugs. However, such complexity measure
can help to predict the fixing time of similar types of bug resolved in the
past.
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Concretely, answering the following research questions will give more insight
about fixing of security bugs.
How much additional time developers takes to fix security bugs with
higher fan-in complexity?
How can the ‘fan-in’ complexity be used to predict the fixing time of
security fixes?
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Appendix A
Programming Scripts
A.1 Script to Obtain the Bug Entry Log logB
The following shell script is used to retrieve the bug entry log logB from all
three case studies, namely Samba, Mozilla Firefox , and Red Hat . The bug
entry log logB has been used to get the time stamps when the bug is reported
(tREPORTED).
Before running the script, first the bug ids b from the Bugzilla database
for each case study has been extracted. The advance search option at the
Bugzilla database for retrieving the bug ids b for each case study has been
used. In the advance search all the values of “product”, “component”, “ver-
sion”, “target”, “status”, “resolution”, “severity”, “priority”, “hardware”
and “OS” fields have been selected. Of course, different Bugzilla systems
has different limits to show the data set. Therefore, the results of advance
search have been downloaded in the Common Separated Files (csv) file for-
mat. The advance search process is repeatable, e.g. one can search all the
bugs relevant to the Samba case study from their advance search web page 1.
The script starts by assigning the case study Bugzilla URL to the variable
URL. For example, one can assign the URL bugzilla.samba.org for running
1https://bugzilla.samba.org/query.cgi
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the script to get the bug logs of the Samba case study. The second line in
script is assigning the downloaded list of bug ids b csv file to the variable
DATA. The purpose of the third line is to store the output from the script
in the folder name tables. Then, the condition that a file relevant to bug
id b exists in the folder reports is checked. In cases when no file exists in
the folder reports the file is downloaded from its web page using the bug
identifier showbug.cgi?id. The downloaded web is moved to the folder bug
reports with the name bugentry id.
Finally, the script to obtain the time stamps when the bug is reported
tREPORTED has been called. The details of script to obtain the time stamps
when the bug is reported are given in the following subsection A.3.
1 \#\ !/ b in / bash
2 URL=b u g z i l l a . case−study . org
3 DATA=bugs case−study . csv
4 echo > t a b l e s /”$DATA” bug eventstamps . txt
5 i f [ ! −e r e p o r t s / bugentry $ id . html ] ; then
6 c u r l −s −O ” https : //$URL/show bug . c g i ? id=$id ”
7 mv show bug . c g i \? id\=$id r e p o r t s / bugentry $ id . html
8 f i
9 awk −f b u g i n i t .awk −v id=$id r e p o r t s / bugentry $ id . html >>
t a b l e s /”$DATA” b u g e v e n t i n i t i a l . txt
10 done
A.2 Script to Obtain the Bug Activity Log
logA
The following shell script is used to retrieve all the bug activity logsA from
the Bugzilla database for all the case studies. The bug activity logs logA
have been used to get the time stamps when the bug is assigned and resolved
tASSIGNED and tRESOLV ED respectively. The same bug ids b csv file retrieved
from the advanced bug search has been used as explained in the above section
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to obtain the bug entry logs. The first two lines has been copied from the
above script to obtain the bug entry logs because the variables “URL” and
“DATA” are initialised in this script in the same ways as is done in the script
to obtain the bug entry logs. The third line of script is used to redirect the
output file of bug tASSIGNED and tRESOLV ED to the folder “tables”. The
procedure starts by checking the value of each bug id b in the “reports”
folder. In cases where there is no file of bug activity log relevant to the
bug id b found in the folder then the bug activity web page with the URL
showactivity.cgi?id relevant to the bug id b is obtained. The obtained bug
log logA is moved to the reports folder with the corresponding bug id b.
Finally, the script to obtain the values of time stamps when the bug is “As-
signed” tASSIGNED and “Resolved” tRESOLVED has been obtained and
moved to the folder “tables”.
1 #!/ bin / bash
2 URL=b u g z i l l a . case−study . org
3 DATA=bugs case−study . csv
4 echo > t a b l e s /”$DATA” b u g e v e n t i n i t i a l . txt
5 for id in ‘ cut −d , −f 1 b u g z i l l a /$DATA‘ ; do
6 i f [ ! −e r e p o r t s / $ id . html ] ; then
7 c u r l −s −O ” https : //$URL/ sho w ac t i v i t y . c g i ? id=$id ”
8 mv sho w ac t i v i t y . c g i \? id\=$id r e p o r t s / $ id . html
9 f i
10 awk −f bugeventstamps .awk −v id=$id r e p o r t s / $ id . html >> t a b l e s /”
$DATA” bug eventstamps . txt
11 done
A.3 Obtaining tREPORTED : the Event Stamp
When the Bug is Reported
The following “AWK” script is used to get the time stamps when the bug
is reported (tREPORTED). The logB is input of the script and the bug id
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b and time stamps when the bug is reported tREPORTED is output of the
script. An “AWK” script starts with the pattern matching string. Therefore,
the first line of script is “Reported” indicating the start of script when the
pattern “Reported” appears in the data. The screen-shot of example logB
indicates the pattern matching string in the data of logB as shown in the
Figure A.1. The second line of script is setting the variable start to true.
The next statement in the script is matching a regular expression in the data
of logB to split the time stamp’s data from the other information, which
is irrelevant. Before splitting the string to get the regular expression, the
value of start variable is checked to ensure that the string to split must be
related to the pattern “reported”. Then, the split statement is used with the
three parameters to split the string containing the time stamp. The “AWK”
function split($1, a, >) splits the first field of the string using the delimiter
“ >′′. In the next statement, the second element a[2] of the array a is assigned
to the date variable by adding the spaces between the second $2 and the third
$3 fields. For example, the second element a[2] of the array a in the example
logB data is 2003 − 09 − 0709 : 23UTC as shown in the Figure A.1. The
2003− 09− 07, 09 : 23, UTC are the first, second and the third elements of
the second element a[2] of array a in the given example logB data. The date
variable is printed with the variable id, which corresponds to the bug id b of
the time stamp tREPORTED. The variable id is the parameter provided to the
script at the time of call. After printing the time stamp data, the variable
start is rested to the zero.
Input: logB
1 /Reported/ {
2 s t a r t = 1
3 }
4 /<td>[0−9]+−.∗”/ {
5 i f ( s t a r t ) {
6 s p l i t ( $1 , a , />/)
7 date=a [ 2 ] ” ” $2 ” ” $3
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8 p r in t id , date
9 s t a r t = 0
10 }
11 }
Output: (b, tREPORTED)
Figure A.1: The example of logB data to retrieve the value of tREPORTED.
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A.4 Obtaining tASSIGNED and tRESOLV ED : the
Bug Event Stamps When the Bug is As-
signed to Fix and When the Bug is Fixed
The following “AWK” script is used to get the time stamps when the bug
is assigned (tASSIGNED) and resolved (tRESOLV ED). The logA is input of the
script and the bug id b and time stamps when the bug is assigned tASSIGNED
and resolved tRESOLV ED are the outputs.
In the bug activity log logA, the assigned, resolved and reopened status are
added at the time when the bug status changes to any of these states. There-
fore, the script starts with the pattern matching string Added as indicated on
the first line to begin the process. The data to match the pattern “Added”
is indicated in the Figure A.2 of logA example screen-shot.
The values of variables start and last are set to true by assigning 1 to both of
them. The purpose of start variable is to process the time stamps at the time
of bug assignment. On the other hand, the purpose of the last variable is to
only get the latest value of time stamps when the bug is resolved, ignoring
all the reopening states.
The script is divided into two parts. The purpose of the first part of the
script is to process the regular expression by matching the pattern starting
with “ < tdrowspan′′. Once the script finds the pattern, it splits the third
field of the split string using the split function and stores in the array a using
the delimiter “ >′′. The second element of array a is stored in the variable
date by adding the spaces between the fourth and fifth fields. Then the value
of the start variable is checked to ensure that the time stamps belong to the
time stamp when the bug was assigned. The value of the date variable is
then assigned to the firstdate variable and the value of the start variable is
set to zero.
The purpose of the second part of the script is to check to which status
of bug the obtained time stamps from the data of logA belong. To check
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that the obtained time stamps belong to the status of the bug when it is
assigned, the pattern < td > ASSIGNED is used. In cases where the
pattern matches, the value of the b1 variable is set to firstdate. Similarly,
the patterns matching to < td > RESOLV ED and < td > REOPENED
are matched to check whether the time stamp is related to “resolved” and
“reopened” states of the bug. The example of patterns matching the status
of the bug are shown in the Figure A.2 of example logA. In the logA when the
pattern is matched to “Resolved”, the variable last is set to true by assigning
the value 1. However, the value of the last variable is set to zero when the
pattern is matched to “reopened” state of bug.
In the last part of the script, the value of the last variable is checked to be
true with the help of condition last == 1. If the value is true then the bug
id b with the value of assigned b1 and resolved b2 are printed in the file.
Otherwise, the script prints only the value of time stamp when the bug is
assigned b1.
Input: logA
1 /<th>Added<\/th>/ {
2 s t a r t = 1
3 l a s t=−1
4 }
5 /<td rowspan=”[0−9]+” va l i gn=”top ”>[0−9]+−[0−9]+/ {
6 sp l i t ( $3 , a ,/>/)
7 date=a [ 2 ] ” ” $4 ” ” $5
8 i f ( s t a r t ) {
9 f i r s t d a t e = date
10 s t a r t = 0
11 }
12 }
13 /<td>ASSIGNED/ {
14 b1=”ASSIGNED: ” f i r s t d a t e
15 }
16 /<td>RESOLVED/ {
17 b2=”RESOLVED: ” date
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18 l a s t =1
19 }
20 /<td>REOPENED/ {
21 b3=”REOPENED: ” date
22 l a s t =0
23 }
24 END {
25 i f ( l a s t == 1)
26 print id , b1 , b2
27 e l s e
28 print id , b1
29 }
Output: (b, tASSIGNED, tRESOLV ED)
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Figure A.2: The example of logA data to obtain the bug tASSIGNED and
tRESOLV ED time stamps.
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A.5 Obtaining Call Graphs
To use Egypt for generating a call graph, it is important to install the GCC
version 4.7, which is compatible for the “fdump-rtl-expand” option. This
option is not available in the default version 4.2. Through this option GCC
dumps the given source code file to its intermediate representation with an
extension of .expand. The following is a statement by statement description
of the code used to obtain the call graphs. In the first statement, the folder
path to Samba in shell has been changed to do operations on the Samba
code. The second statement is used to install the gcc compiler version4.7.
After the installation of the compiler, the command “CC” standing for “C-
compiler” is used to generate the expand files from the gcc compiler using
the option “fdump-rtl-expand”. Before doing this the Samba code first needs
to be configured. This is done using the waf configure command. After the
configuration, in the next statement the Samba “make file” is generated to
build executable Samba code. The purpose of “make file” is to organise
the code compilations. Then, the expand file output is redirected to the
callgraph.dot file in the tmp folder. Finally, the output is refined by removing
the first and last lines digrpah and } through searching the files with the
.expand extension only. The purpose of refining the output is to make sure
that it only contains the calling relationship.
1 cd ˜/samba
2 sudo port i n s t a l l gcc47 // for mac use r s
3 CC=”gcc−mp−4.7 −fdump−r t l−expand” . / b u i l d t o o l s / bin /waf c o n f i g u r e
4 CC=”gcc−mp−4.7 −fdump−r t l−expand” make
5 echo > /tmp/ c a l l g r a p h . dot /echo commands r e d i r e c t the output to
the c a l l g r a p h . dot f i l e \
6 f i n d . −name ” ∗ . expand” | while read f i l ename ; do
7 egypt \ $ f i l ename | grep −v ” digraph ” | grep −v ”\}” >> /tmp/
c a l l g r a p h . dot
8 done
128
A.6 Program to Compute the Fan-ins of a
Call Graph
1 public stat ic HashMap<Str ing , Integer> getFanin ( ) throws Exception {
2 HashMap<Str ing , Set<Str ing>> g ; // input
3 HashMap<Str ing , Integer> f = null ; // output
4 g = new HashMap<Str ing , Set<Str ing >>();
5 Scanner scanner = new Scanner (new Fi leReader ( ” ca l l g raph −3 .6 . 12 . dot ” ) ) ;
6 while ( scanner . hasNextLine ( ) ) {
7 St r ing l i n e = scanner . nextLine ( ) ;
8 S t r ing [ ] l a b e l s = ( St r ing [ ] ) l i n e . s p l i t ( ”\”” ) ;
9 i f ( ( l a b e l s . l ength > 3) ) {
10 St r ing v prime = l a b e l s [ 1 ] ;
11 St r ing v = l a b e l s [ 3 ] ;
12 i f ( ! ( g . containsKey ( v ) ) ) {
13 Set<Str ing> c = new HashSet<Str ing >() ;
14 c . add ( ( v prime ) ) ;
15 g . put (v , c ) ;
16 } else {
17 Set<Str ing> c = g . get ( v ) ;
18 c . add ( v prime ) ;
19 }
20 }
21 }
22 f = new HashMap<Str ing , Integer >() ;
23 for ( S t r ing v : g . keySet ( ) )
24 f . put (v , g . get ( v ) . s i z e ( ) ) ;
25 return f ;
26 }
A.7 Program to Get List of the Functions
from the Change Set
1 public stat ic HashSet<Str ing> getChangedFunctions ( S t r ing p)
2 throws Exception
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3 {
4 HashSet<Str ing> v p = new HashSet<Str ing >() ;
5 Process proc = Runtime . getRuntime ( ) . exec (new St r ing [ ] { ”/ bin /
bash” , ”−c” , ”/ usr / bin / g i t d i f f ” + p + ” . . ” + p + ”ˆ” }) ;
6 proc . waitFor ( ) ;
7 Scanner scanner = new Scanner (new InputStreamReader ( proc .
getInputStream ( ) ) ) ;
8 while ( scanner . hasNextLine ( ) ) {
9 St r ing l i n e = scanner . nextLine ( ) ;
10 St r ing [ ] l a b e l s = ( St r ing [ ] ) l i n e . s p l i t ( ”\@\@” ) ;
11 i f ( ( l a b e l s . l ength > 2) && l a b e l s [ 2 ] . c onta in s ( ” ( ” ) ) {
12 St r ing [ ] namesWithoutBrackets = l a b e l s [ 2 ] . s p l i t ( ” \\( ” ) ;
13 St r ing [ ] names = namesWithoutBrackets [ 0 ] . s p l i t ( ”\\W” ) ;
14 St r ing v d e l t a = names [ names . l ength − 1 ] ;
15 v p . add ( ( v d e l t a ) ) ;
16 }
17 }
18 return v p ;
19 }
A.8 Program to Obtain the List of Patches
1 public stat ic HashSet<Str ing> getPatches ( )
2 throws Exception
3 {
4 HashSet<Str ing> P = new HashSet<Str ing >() ;
5 Process proc = Runtime . getRuntime ( ) . exec (new St r ing [ ] { ”/ bin /
bash” , ”−c” , ”/ usr / bin / g i t −−no−pager l og > t . l og ” }) ;
6 proc . waitFor ( ) ;
7 Scanner scanner = new Scanner (new F i l e ( ” t . l og ” ) ) ;
8 while ( scanner . hasNextLine ( ) ) {
9 St r ing l i n e = scanner . nextLine ( ) ;
10 i f ( l i n e . s tartsWith ( ”commit” ) ) {
11 St r ing [ ] l a b e l s = ( St r ing [ ] ) l i n e . s p l i t ( ”commit” ) ;
12 i f ( ( l a b e l s . l ength > 1) ) {
13 St r ing p ID = l a b e l s [ 1 ] ;
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14 P. add ( ( p ID ) ) ;
15 }
16 }
17 }
18 return P;
19 }
A.9 Program to Compute Accumulative Fan-
ins of all the Patches
1 public stat ic f loat getAccumulativeFanin ( HashSet<Str ing> P,
HashMap <Str ing , Integer> F v ) throws Exception {
2 HashMap<Str ing , Integer> F p = new HashMap<Str ing , Integer
>() ;
3 for ( S t r ing p : P) {
4 HashSet<Str ing> V p = getChangedFunctions (p) ;
5 int f p =0;
6 for ( S t r ing v : V p )
7 i f ( F v . get ( v ) !=null )
8 f p= f p + F v . get ( v ) ;
9 F p . put (p , f p ) ;
10 }
A.10 Program to Compute Average Fan-ins
of all the Patches
1 public stat ic f loat getAverageFanin ( HashSet<Str ing> P, HashMap <
Str ing , Integer> F p ) throws Exception {
2 int sum f p = 0 ;
3 for ( S t r ing p : P)
4 sum f p = sum f p + F p . get (p) ;
5 avg f p = ( f loat ) sum f p /P. s i z e ( ) ;
6 return avg f p ;
7 }
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A.11 Program to Obtain the List of Bugs and
their Corresponding Patches
1 // precond i t i on : t . l o g always s t a r t s wi th ”commit”
2 public stat ic HashMap<Str ing , HashSet<Str ing>> getBugsPatches ( )
3 throws Exception {
4 HashMap<Str ing , HashSet<Str ing>> B P = new HashMap<Str ing ,
HashSet<St r ing >>() ;
5 Scanner scanner = new Scanner (new F i l e ( ” t . l og ” ) ) ;
6 S t r ing patchID = null ;
7 S t r ing matchingStr ing = null ;
8 S t r ing f i r s t L i n e = null ;
9 while ( scanner . hasNext ( ) ) {
10 i f ( f i r s t L i n e==null ) {
11 f i r s t L i n e = scanner . nextLine ( ) ;
12 }
13 else i f ( f i r s t L i n e . s tartsWith ( ( ”commit” ) ) ) {
14 St r ing [ ] commitLine = ( St r ing [ ] ) f i r s t L i n e . s p l i t ( ”commit” ) ;
15 patchID=commitLine [ 1 ] ;
16 do {
17 Pattern pattern = Pattern . compi le ( ” . ∗ [ ˆ a−z ] ( bug | f i x |
c o r r e c t ) \\D∗(\\d+) .∗ ” ,
18 Pattern . CASE INSENSITIVE) ;
19 matchingStr ing = scanner . nextLine ( ) ;
20 Matcher matcher = pattern . matcher ( matchingStr ing ) ;
21 i f ( matcher . f i n d ( ) ) {
22 St r ing bugID = matcher . group (1) ;
23 i f ( ! ( B P . containsKey ( bugID ) ) ) {
24 HashSet<Str ing> P = new HashSet<Str ing >() ;
25 P. add ( patchID ) ;
26 B P . put ( bugID , P) ;
27 }
28 else {
29 HashSet<Str ing> P = B P . get ( bugID ) ;
30 P. add ( patchID ) ;
31 B P . put ( bugID , P) ;
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32 }
33 }
34 f i r s t L i n e=matchingStr ing ;
35 } while ( ! ( f i r s t L i n e . s tartsWith ( ”commit” ) )&& scanner . hasNext
( ) ) ;
36 }
37 }
38 return B P ;
39 }
A.12 Program to Get Bugs’ Fan-ins
1 public stat ic HashMap<Str ing , Integer> getBugsFanin (HashMap<
Str ing ,
2 HashSet<Str ing>> B P ,
3 HashMap<Str ing , Integer> F p )throws Exception {
4 HashMap<Str ing , Integer> F B = new HashMap<Str ing ,
Integer >() ;
5 for ( S t r ing b : B P . keySet ( ) ) {
6 int f b =0;
7 for ( S t r ing p : B P . get (b) )
8 f b= f b+ F p . get (p) ;
9 i f ( f b !=0)
10 F B . put (b , f b ) ;
11 }
12 return F B ;
13 }
A.13 Program to Get Average Fan-ins of all
the Bugs
1 public stat ic f loat getAverageFaninBugs (HashMap<Str ing , Integer>
F B)
2 throws Exception {
3 f loat avg f B =0;
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4 int sum f b =0;
5 for ( S t r ing b : F B . keySet ( ) )
6 i f (F B . get (b) !=null )
7 sum f b= sum f b + F B . get (b) ;
8 avg f B=sum f b /F B . s i z e ( ) ;
9 return avg f B ;
10 }
A.14 Program to Get Average Fan-ins of CVE
and Non-CVE Bugs
1 // precond i t i on : f i r s t l i n e s t a r t s wi th the bug id
2 // output : the program w i l l output fan−in o f CVE bugs i f the
prov ided to i t con ta ins CVE re l e v an t bug . On the o ther hand ,
i f the f i l e prov ided to i t con ta ins the Non−CVE bugs then the
program w i l l output the fan−i n s o f Non−CVE bugs
3 public stat ic f loat getAverageFaninBugs ( F i l e f i l e , HashMap<
Str ing , Integer> F B) throws Exception {
4 HashSet<Str ing> B withtype = new HashSet<Str ing >() ;
5 Scanner scanner = new Scanner ( f i l e ) ;
6 while ( scanner . hasNext ( ) ) {
7 St r ing bugID = scanner . nextLine ( ) ;
8 B withtype . add ( bugID ) ;
9 }
10 int sum f b =0;
11 for ( S t r ing b : B withtype ) {
12 i f (F B . get (b) !=null )
13 sum f b = sum f b + F B . get (b) ;
14 }
15 f loat avg f B= ( f loat ) sum f b / B withtype . s i z e ( ) ;
16 return avg f B ;
17 }
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Appendix B
Definitions and Calculations
In this appendix section, the first subsection explains the symbols and defini-
tions used in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 of the thesis. The second subsection
describes the p-value and the screen-shots of p-values of all the case studies
derived from the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS).
B.1 Definitions of Symbols used in the Chap-
ter 3 and Chapter 4
In this section, the symbols and definitions used in Chapter 3 and Chapter
4 have been provided respectively.
In the table B.1, each row introduces a symbol and its definitions used in
the 3, and the instance of the symbol in the Samba case study.
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Table B.1: Symbols and definitions used in Chapter 3.
SymbolDescription Definition E.g. Samba
LOGS
A set of bug entries logB and bug
activities logA
Definition 1 6171-items
B A set of bugs Definition 1 6171-items
Bs
The set of security bugs Bs is the
subset of bugs B
Definition 1 9-items
C A set of derived bug life cycle from LDefinition 2 Omitted
E A set of bug fixing event stamps Definition 3 Omitted
τ1 Duration of bugs triage time set Definition 4 22369.05-days
τ2 Duration of bugs fixing time set Definition 4121396.35-days
Rτ A set of weekly release dates Definition 5 Omitted
τ ′1
A set of precise triage duration
based on weekly release fix
Definition 6 Omitted
λ(B) The planned rush in triaging of bugs Definition 7 Omitted
Similarly, in the table B.2, each row introduces a symbol and its definitions
used in the 4, and the instances of symbol in the Samba case study.
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Table B.2: Symbols and definitions used in Chapter 4.
Symbol Description Definition E.g. Samba
G =< V,E >
A directed graph of function calls
(i.e., call graph)
Definition 8 1.00
Fv The set of function fan-ins of a call graph Definition 9 2553.00
Cv The set of callers of a function Definition 9 Omitted
L A set of commit logs Definition 10 Omitted
P A set of all the patches Definition 10 156694.00
p A set of changes as a patch Definition 11 Omitted
∆ A change to the code Definition 11 Omitted
Vp
A subset of functions being
changed by a patch p
Definition 11 Omitted
FP The set of patch fan-ins Definition 12 458958
fP The accumulative fan-in of a patch Definition 12 2.92
B The set of bugs Definition 13 2540
BP The set of bugs and their corresponding patchesDefinition 13 2540
FB A set of bugs fan-ins Definition 14 Omitted
fb The sum of bugs fan-ins Definition 14 21306.00
f¯B The average fan-in of a set of bugs Definition 14 8.39
BS The set of given security bugs Definition 15 9
fbs The sum of security bug fan-ins Definition 15 317.00
f¯Bs The average fan-in of security bugs Definition 15 26.42
5.2 Calculating p-value to Evaluate the Sta-
tistical Significance of Rush
The p-value is the probability statistical value to test the significance of
sample population data. The Mann Whitney U-test to statistically evaluate
the significance of rush in all the three case studies has been chosen based on
the p-value using predetermined threshold of 0.05. For applying the Mann
137
Whitney U-test, The standard SPSS 1 statistical package has been used for
the statistical analysis of data.
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SPSS
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